Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 56

Issue 1

Article 9

April 1980

Economic Regulation of Business: The Seventh Circuit's NonEconomic Approach
Mark R. Lee

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mark R. Lee, Economic Regulation of Business: The Seventh Circuit's Non-Economic Approach , 56 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 205 (1980).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol56/iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu,
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu.

ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS: THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT'S NON-ECONOMIC APPROACH
MARK

R. LEE*

Major business decisions are ordinarily responsive to the rewards
offered and the penalties imposed by the marketplace. Those rewards
and penalities reflect aggregate consumer preferences, the cost of productive inputs and the like-in short, market forces. These market
forces are instrumental in serving economic efficiency. Indeed, we routinely rely upon market forces to guide business decisions so that all
who are willing to pay the cost of a service are supplied; so that sellers
are induced to improve quality; and so that resources are put to their
most valuable use. In some sectors of the economy, including railroading, trucking, and natural gas transportation, however, the Congress
has interposed laws between market forces and major business decisions. These regulatory laws, along with their complementary administrative agencies and rules, purportedly may function either to promote
or compromise economic efficiency. Those that would promote efficiency establish principles and institutions designed to preserve it by
correcting market imperfections. Those which would compromise efficiency create mechanisms designed to sacrifice some of it by protecting
from competitive erosion a portion of the income of existing market
participants. The function to be served by these regulatory laws ought
to be a court's touchstone when a court is called upon to interpret them.
When resolving regulatory cases, a court should explain its decisions in terms of the functions of the applicable laws. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit should have done so in
the four major regulatory opinions it issued during the 1978-79 term.'
Explaining decisions in these terms is not easy, however, for three obstacles loom large. First, the cases tend to be of great complexity and
difficulty, frequently involving highly specialized and technical areas of
knowledge. The Seventh Circuit, for example, had to cope with the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University Law School; J.D., University of
Texas; B.A., Yale University; former staff attorney, Antitrust Division, United States Department
of Justice; former Assistant Attorney General, State of Texas; member, Texas Bar.
1. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n, 590 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1979);
Illinois v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 589 F.2d 1327 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2884
(1979); Niedert Motor Service, Inc. v. United States, 583 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1978); Chicago &
North Western Transp. Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1978).
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intricate problems of abandonment of railway lines 2 and discontinuance of service by railroads,' entry by a trucking firm into a new mar5
ket, 4 and the overall price level for the transportation of natural gas.
Second, courts must be sensitive to the institutional competence of administrative agencies. Third, few judges are conversant with economic
analysis and fewer still are comfortable with it. Yet, unless these obstacles are surmounted neither the principles underlying regulatory decisions nor the reasoning which supports them can be very clear.
Moreover, predicating the outcome of future decisions becomes highly
problematic, frustrating the tasks of both lawyers and agencies. The
1978-79 opinions of the Seventh Circuit reviewed here, unfortunately,
made little contribution towards clarity or predictability.
BRANCH LINE ABANDONMENT

UNDER THE RAILROAD

REVITALIZATION AND REGULATORY REFORM ACT OF

1976

6
In Chicago & North Western TransportationCo. v. United States,
the Seventh Circuit reviewed Interstate Commerce Commission 7 regulations that set forth 8 the method by which the ICC would assess the
cost responsibility of railroad branch line operations threatened with
abandonment 9 and the responses the ICC might have made to the fail2. Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1978).
3. Illinois v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 589 F.2d 1327 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.Ct.
2884 (1979).
4. Niedert Motor Service, Inc. v. United States, 583 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1978).
5. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Reg. Comm'n, 590 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1979).
6. 582 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1978).
7. Hereinafter referred to as the ICC.
8. The court also reviewed ICC regulations that (a) required that petitions to investigate
proposed abandonments be verified and filed within 35 days of the filing date of the railroad's
abandonment application, 49 C.F.R. §§ 1121.36(a)(1), 1121.36(c)(1) (1977); and (b) prescribed the
revenue data that a railroad proposing abandonment had to submit along with its abandonment
application, 49 C.F.R. § 1121.32(d) (1977) (this regulation referred to another establishing the
method of attributing revenues to branch lines; see 49 C.F.R. § 1121.46 (1977)). The regulations
pertaining to petitions to investigate were challenged by, among others, the American Railway
Supervisors' Association, a labor union, as inconsistent with the provisions relating to such petitions in the statute governing railroad abandonments. See 49 U.S.C. § 10904(a) (Supp. 1979) (a
reenactment of what was then 49 U.S.C. § la(1)-(3) (1976)). The regulations pertaining to revenue
data were challenged by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as implicitly overruling, without
adequate explanation, the so-called "50 per cent rule." The 50 per cent rule was an arbitrary
method of attributing to the branch line the costs of rail operations conducted on and off the
branch line, a method that had occasionally been used by the Commission in abandonment proceedings. Both challenges were easily brushed aside by the court, but the court omitted to explain
what it was doing in terms of the economic function of the applicable statute. See 582 F.2d at
1058-61.
9. 49 C.F.R. §§ 1121.42(b), 1121.42(c)(4), 1121.42(c)(6), 1121.42(1), 1121.42(m), 1121.44
(1977). 49 C.F.R. § 1121.44 (1977), the last of those regulations listed, fixed the return on the
value of a branch line owned by a railroad in reorganization for which branch line operations
would be held responsible. It fixed that return as equal to the "average yield on all railroad bonds
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ure by a railroad proposing abandonment and a potential subsidizer
opposing it to reach a subsidy/continuation agreement. 'oThe court invalidated most of the regulations," thereby making it easier for railroads to shed unprofitable operations and, perhaps, more expensive for
subsidizers to support such operations.
Background
Generally, unregulated railroads would decide to abandon branch
lines whenever they expected to maximize their net revenues from doing so or whenever the railroads expected their gains to exceed their
losses. To such railroads, the gains would include not only saved operating expenses but also earnings on redeployed resources and reinvested capital; the losses would consist principally of foregone
revenues. We would expect, therefore, that an abandonment decision
which would appear to an unregulated railroad to maximize net reve2
nue would also appear to society to be economically efficient.'
Nevertheless, railroad decisions to abandon branch lines have long
been subject to review by the ICC. 13 The function of that review has
not been to promote efficiency.' 4 Indeed, before approving an abandonment, the ICC has consistently balanced efficiency against the imfor the week immediately preceding the execution of the subsidy agreement, as quoted by any
standard investors' service.
... Id at § 1121.44(b). The court found this regulation linguistically incompatible with 49 U.S.C. § 10905(a)(2)(b) (Supp. 1979) (a reenactment of what was then
49 U.S.C. § la(l 1)(b) (1976)). That law provided for a return equal to "the mean cost of capital of
railroads not in reorganization." 582 F.2d at 1056-57, citing 49 U.S.C. § la(I l)(b) (1976).
10. 49 C.F.R. § 1121.38(i)(2) (1977).
I1. 582 F.2d at 1048-58.
12. The equivalence in gains and losses would not hold with respect to a branch line abandonment by an ineffectively regulated railroad that enjoyed a monopoly in transportation service
between the points served by that branch line. The equivalence would not hold in that exceptional circumstance since certain effects of the abandonment, like the reduction in supra-competitive revenues, would be considered a loss by the railroad but not by society. The exceptional
circumstance may be safely ignored, however, for two reasons. First, it may be ignored because
we are concerned about prohibiting an abandonment that a railroad proposes and a railroad that
found itself in that exceptional circumstance would be less inclined than other railroads to propose
one. Second, the exceptional circumstance may be ignored because it is unlikely to be observed in
the work-a-day world in which trucks and trucking service are so available. S. REP. No. 499, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1975), reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 14.
13. The ICC has had power over abandonments since at least 1920. 41 Stat. 477 (1920).
14. Theoretically, the ICC could review abandonment decisions in order to promote efficiency. Rail service might confer benefits for which the railroad would be unable to obtain payment from its ordinary ratepayers. Those benefits might be bestowed on so many and such a
varied lot of recipients that the railroad could not effectively negotiate with them. Thus, the decision to abandon might appear revenue-maximizing to the railroad but inefficient to society (the
marginal revenue might be less than the marginal benefit of the service). The ICC might then veto
the decision to abandon as inefficient. Actually, the ICC has never so justified an order prohibiting abandonment. Moreover, it is not at all clear that significant external benefits are associated
with rail service. If they were, they might be offset by significant external costs.
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mediate loss of income likely to be suffered by railroad patrons situated
near the affected branch line and their employees and customers.
When the ICC has reckoned the benefits of efficiency, small compared
with the costs of lost income, it has sometimes sacrificed the former for
15
the latter and vetoed abandonment.
Congress was apparently less than satisfied with the balance struck
by the ICC.16 As a result, Congress enacted section la of the Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976.17 Section la' 8 replaced and significantly amended the Interstate Commerce Act provisions governing abandonment. 19 Section la established a two-stage
process for the disposition of proposed line abandonments. During the
first stage, the ICC must determine whether the "present or future public convenience and necessity require or permit such abandonment
20 In so deciding, it must "consider whether there will be a seri...
ous adverse impact on rural and community development by such
abandonment." ' 2 1 If the ICC finds that abandonment would serve the
public convenience and necessity and should, therefore, be certified, the
ICC must publish its findings in the Federal Register. 22 The first stage
appears to be substantially similar to the repealed provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act, 23 but the second stage, which is entered only if
the ICC finds that abandonment should be certified, is entirely new.
15. Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153, 169 (1926); Norfolk Southern Rwy. Co. Abandonment, 282 I.C.C. 376 (1952); W.K. JONES, REGULATED INDUSTRIES (2d ed. 1976) 420-23.
Preventing certain branch line abandonments could also be justified, at least in theory, as a means
of distributing what would otherwise be monopoly revenues (what is often called the "consumer
surplus"). Consider this example. Suppose that Robber Barron Railroad Co. provides service
over two main lines and numerous branch lines. Absent regulation, it would charge all of its
customers rates that would exceed, by different amounts, the costs for which they were causally
responsible. Suppose that Robber Barron would then earn $100,000,000. But Robber Barron is
regulated by the ICC: it might want to limit Robber Barron's total revenues to $90,000,000. To do
that, the ICC would have to control Robber Barron's rates. It would have to, in effect, distribute
$10 million in monopoly revenues. The ICC might distribute the monopoly revenues in such a
way that the shippers served by one particular branch line would be charged rates that would not
cover the costs for which they are causally responsible. If Robber Barron were then permitted to
abandon that branch line, it could, to a degree, successfully evade the ICC's attempt to limit its
total revenues. To prevent that, the ICC might veto the abandonment. The general problem of
what to do with consumer surplus afflicts virtually all rate regulating administrative agencies.
16. See 45 U.S.C. § 801(b) (Supp. 1979).
17. 49 U.S.C. § Ia (1976).
18. Id After the opinion in Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. was published, the Congress recodified and reenacted the Interstate Commerce Act. What was section Ia is now part of
49 U.S.C. §§ 10903-10906 (Supp. 1979). For convenience and to facilitate comparison of this
analysis with the case, what was section Ia will still be referred to herein as section Ia.
19. Id. § Ia (1976) (current version at id. §§ 10903-10906 (Supp. 1979)).
20. Id. § la(l) (1976) (current version at id. § 10903(a) (Supp. 1979)).
21. Id. § la(4) (1976) (current version at id. § 10903(a) (Supp. 1979)).
22. Id. § 10905(b) (Supp. 1979). See 582 F.2d at 1047.
23. 49 U.S.C. § ](18)-(22) (1973).
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During the second stage, the ICC must determine whether a
financially responsible entity has offered the railroad, in return for nonabandonment, compensation in an amount likely to "cover the difference between the revenues . . . attributable to [the particular] line...
and the avoidable cost of providing . . . freight service on [the] line,
together with a reasonable return on the value of [the] line."' 24 Upon an
affirmative determination, the ICC must delay issuing its certificate for
a "reasonable time, not to exceed 6 months, as is necessary to enable
such . . .entity to enter into a binding agreement, with the carrier
seeking such abandonment .... -25 If the parties should reach an
agreement, the ICC must again delay issuing its certificate for the duration of the agreement. 26 This two-stage process connects abandonment
review with subsidy/continuation negotiations and involves the ICC in
those negotiations.
This connection and the ICC's involvement could be expected to
reinforce the ICC's awareness that the income of those dependent on
branch lines could be protected through subsidized continuation, as
well as through the veto of abandonments. That awareness could be
expected, in turn, to make the ICC more willing to approve abandonments. Section la, then, seems calculated to change the pattern of ICC
decisions without withdrawing railroad abandonments from ICC review. Apparently, it is the function of the section to tilt toward efficiency the scales used by the ICC to weigh efficiency and lost income,
thereby striking a new balance more satisfactory to the Congress.
The Branch Line Cost Responsibility Regulations
To discharge its duties at each stage of the section la process, the
ICC must assess the costs for which rail operations on a branch line are
to be held responsible. In railroad parlance, those costs are called
"avoidable costs."127 The ICC must assess these costs because it needs
28
to measure the difference between them and branch line revenues.
That difference is both the best measure of the efficiency gains from
abandonment, a key consideration at stage one, and the statutorily
24. Id. § la(6)(a) (1976) (current version at id. § 10905(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 1979)). Alternatively,
the financially responsible entity may offer to purchase the branch line. Id. § la(6)(b) (1976)
(current version at id. § 10905(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 1979)).
25. Id. § la(6) (1976) (current version at id. § 10905(b) (Supp. 1979)).
26. Id
27. Price & Berardino, Defining Economic Terms Used inthe RailroadRevitalization andRegulatory Reform Act, 9 TRANSP. L.J. 133, 154-58 (1977) (hereinafter referred to as Price & Berardino).
28. 49 U.S.C. § la(6)(a)(ii)(A) (1976). See Price & Berardino, supra note 27, at 134.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

mandated measure of the adequacy of a subsidy/continuation offer, the
only issue at stage two. Not surprisingly, the ICC has chosen, for reasons of administrative convenience, to use the same assessment method
for the purposes of each stage. 29 Thus, the assessment of avoidable
costs bears heavily on a railroad's ability to abandon burdensome
branch lines and on the level of compensation likely to be required of a
potential continuation subsidizer.3 0
The essential assessment criterion for the purposes of both stages
ought to be the principle of causal responsibility. 3 1 In deciding whether
a branch line should be closed or how much should be offered to keep
it open, the ICC should give careful scrutiny to those costs that the
railroad would be caused to suffer as a result of its failure to abandon
32
the branch line.
Consider first the decision whether a branch line should be closed.
That decision, as already indicated, turns on the balance struck between efficiency and lost income. Despite section la's tilt, it is still perfectly clear that the ICC may decide, in any given proceeding, to
sacrifice efficiency in order to protect lost income to keep a particular
branch line open. In making such a decision, of course, the ICC would
have to give proper consideration to the efficiency gains from abandonment. To give that kind of consideration, the ICC would have to understand how abandonment could yield efficiency and how those gains
could be measured. Abandonment would yield efficiency by freeing
resources that would otherwise be used to continue branch line service
the costs of which its patrons are unwilling to pay. 33 Once freed, those
resources would not remain idle long. They would be used to create
some other service or even a product for which its consumers would be
willing to pay. Creating that other service or product would put those
29. Ex Parte No. 274 (Sub-No. 2), Abandonment of RailroadLines and Discontinuance of Service 4-5 [hereinafter cited as ICC Abandonment Regulations Report) (reprinted in Brief of Railroad Petitioners at apps. 87-88, Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d
1043 (7th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Railroad Petitioners]).
30. See Price & Berardino, supra note 27, at 133-34.
31. I A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 71 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as
KAHN].

32. As a result of a failure to abandon a branch line, society may suffer costs that the railroad
does not. For example, society, but not the railroad, may suffer the costs of traffic jams created
when trains operating on branch lines cross highways. It would be difficult to measure these
external costs. Even if they could be measured the principle of second-best might suggest that the
ICC ignore them in making its decisions. And even if they could be measured and the ICC
considered them, they might be balanced by external benefits.
33. That branch line patrons are unwilling to pay the costs of continued branch line service
may be inferred from the fact that the railroad proposes the branch line for abandonment. If the
patrons were willing to pay those costs, the railroad would have little reason to abandon.
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resources to a more valuable use, as measured by willingness to pay,
than would continuing branch line service. Freeing those resources,
therefore, would be efficient. The gains could be measured by the difference between the payments branch line patrons would be willing to
make for continued service and the costs that could be saved through
abandonment. Those payments would be approximately equal to expected branch line revenues. 34 The costs saved would be those the railroad would be caused to suffer as a result of its failure to abandon the
branch line. Thus, in deciding whether a branch line should be closed,
the ICC must assess avoidable costs on the basis of causal responsibility.
Now consider the decision of how much should be offered to keep
a branch line open. In analyzing that decision it would be prudent to
recall that if an offer is deemed adequate, the ICC would have to postpone abandonment for a reasonable period of time, not to exceed six
months, in order to give the railroad and the potential subsidizer an
opportunity to negotiate a subsidy/continuation agreement. During
that negotiation period, of course, the railroad would incur costs for
which it would never be wholly reimbursed. Presumably, Congress decided that it was worth incurring those costs in return for the possibility
that the negotiations would result in continued branch line service offered on a financially sound basis. Congress enacted its decision in section la. The preceding analysis suggests that the ICC should require a
potential subsidizer to just compensate the railroad for the loss it would
incur by continuing service for the duration of the agreement. Requiring any less or any more would be inconsistent with section la. If the
ICC were to require any less, the offer would never be accepted by the
railroad. That would mean that the costs of the negotiation period
could be incurred even though there would be virtually no possibility
of continued service. If the ICC were to require any more, the potential subsidizer might refrain from making an offer or end up paying the
additional sum to the railroad. That could mean that negotiations
which might have led to continued service would simply not take place;
or, it could mean that wealth that the subsidizer, or supporting taxpayers could have used to satisfy other wants would be devoted, perhaps

34. The payments that branch line patrons would be willing to make for continued service
would probably not be precisely equal to expected branch line revenues. The reason for the likely
variance is that patrons might be willing to pay more than the ICC would permit the railroad to
charge them. What the ICC permits the railroad to charge would limit expected branch line
revenues.
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inefficiently, to continued branch line service. 35 And what loss would
the railroad incur? The loss would be identical to the efficiency gains
from abandonment. It would equal the amount by which expected revenues would fall short of the costs that the railroad would be caused to
suffer as a result of its failure to abandon the branch line. Thus, in
deciding how much should be offered to keep a branch line open, just
as in deciding whether a branch line should be closed, the ICC must
assess avoidable costs on the basis of causal responsibility.
Causal responsibility cost assessment appears to be perfectly consistent with section la's tilt toward efficiency. And it seems to be required by section la's language which defines "avoidable costs" as:
all expenses which would be incurred by a carrier in providing a
service which would not be incurred . . . if the line over which such
service was provided were abandoned. Such expenses shall include
but are not limited to all cash inflows which are foregone and all cash
by such carrier as a result of. . .abanoutflows which are incurred
36
doning such service.
Unfortunately for the ICC, putting causal responsibility cost assessment to work is problematic. It is difficult to attribute a given cost to a
particular service because many costs are incurred to produce more
38
than one service 37 and/or counted long after a service is produced.
Section la does not solve these problems. It merely provides that:
foregone cash inflows and incurred outflows shall include
(i) working capital and required capital expenditures, (ii) expenditures to eliminate deferred maintenance, (iii) the current cost of
freight cars, locomotives, and other equipment, and (iv) the foregone
and other
tax benefits from not retiring properties from rail service
39
effects of applicable Federal and State income taxes.
So, with relatively little guidance from the statute, the ICC pursued its
task by promulgating regulations that further described "avoidable
costs. '"40 These regulations provided that avoidable costs would include:
(1) "deferred maintenance" costs necessarily incurred to rehabili35. The lump-sum wealth transfer would not itself engender inefficiency. Neither the subsidizer's nor the railroad's marginal revenues or marginal costs would be affected by it. Typically,
however, the subsidizer is a tax-based political jurisdiction, and any levies required to pay for the
subsidy might engender inefficiency by affecting the marginal revenues and marginal costs of the
taxpayers subject to them.
36. 49 U.S.C. § la(l l)(a) (1976) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 10905(a)(1) (Supp. 1979)).
37. KAHN, supra note 31, at 75-83. Cf.Young, A New Regulatory Accounting System/or
Railroads, 43 I.C.C. PRAC. J. 457, 463 (1976) (in analyzing the deficiencies in the ICC's railroad
cost accounting system, the author explains that most operating expenses are not classified by
functions but rather by the item of property with which they are associated).
38. KAHN, supra note 31, at 70-75.

39. 49 U.S.C. § 10905(a)(1) (Supp. 1979).
40. 49 C.F.R. §§ 1121.40-1121.46 (1977).

ECONOMIC REGULATION

tate a branch line to minimum class I safety standards, as set by
the Federal Railroad Administration, or to a higher safety stansubsidizer requested a level of service which
dard if a potential
41
required it;
(2) the original cost of the locomotives and cars apportioned to the
branch line on the basis of the locomotive-hours or car-miles of
use and to the subsidy-continuation period on the basis of
straight-line depreciation accounting; 42 and
(3) the return required on the investment in locomotives and cars to
be used on the branch line as measured by the interest rate applicable to the most recent equipment trust4 3certificates, conditional sales agreements or equipment lease.
in Chicago & North Western
Some of these regulations were challenged
44
TransportationCo. v. United States.
The railroads4 5 in Chicago & North Western Transportation Co.
asked the Seventh Circuit to invalidate these regulations on the ground
that they were inconsistent with the section l a definition of avoidable
costs. 46 In particular, the railroads objected that in applying these regulations the ICC would, at both stages of the process, illegally ignore
certain costs. 47 Those would be the costs of rehabilitating branch lines
to a condition that the railroads would consider optimal; replacing the
locomotives and cars to be used on the branch line; and financing capital acquisitions through the sale of equity securities. The court's analysis of these objections was generally inadequate, although its
dispositions were for the most part correct or at least acceptable. Let us
consider them seriatim.
Deferred Maintenance
Assessing deferred maintenance costs on the basis of causal responsibility is relatively simple. By failing to abandon a branch line, a
railroad would be caused to suffer the costs of any track and roadbed
rehabilitation necessary for continued service. The extent of that rehabilitation would depend in part on safety regulations and in part on
demand. Federal Railroad Administration regulations prohibit trains
from operating over a line that fails to meet the agency's class one
41. See id. § 1121.42(b).
42. See id. §§ 1121.42(c)(4), 1121.42(l), 1121.42(m).
43. See id. §§ 1121.42(c), 1121.42(1)(3).
44. 582 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1978).
45. The railroad petitioners were twenty-three railroads and the American Association of
Railroads. Brief of Railroad Petitioners, supra note 29, at attachment A.
46. 582 F.2d at 1045.
47. See Brief of Railroad Petitioners, supra note 29. The court either did not perceive or
ignored the relationship between the regulations and the stage one decision.
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safety standards. 48 If service were to be continued over a branch line
that did not pass muster under those minimum standards, the line
would have to be rehabilitated to correct for its failings. The costs of at
least that rehabilitation should certainly be included in the ICC's calculation of avoidable costs-and they were. It is arguable that the costs
of additional rehabilitation should also be included. A potential subsidizer may demand service of a quality that could not be rendered over
a line that meets only minimum standards. The subsidizer might demand, for example, a schedule that would require trains to traverse a
branch line at speeds in excess of the ten mile per hour limit on FRAclass- 1 lines. 49 In that event, additional rehabilitation would have to
be undertaken. The costs of that, but only that, rehabilitation should
also be included in the ICC's calculation of avoidable costs°--and
they were. So, it would appear that the ICC, in promulgating its regulations for the assessment of avoidable deferred maintenance costs, performed its relatively simple job well.
Still, the railroads objected. They argued that the ICC regulations
were improperly exclusive. 5 I The railroads perceived that track and
roadbed conditions that would satisfy safety regulations, or even satisfy
the demand for service, would not necessarily satisfy a railroad engineer. They wanted the ICC to include in its avoidable cost calculations
the costs of rehabilitation necessary to put a branch line into optimal
condition. 52 The railroads' position was understandable, but completely unsupportable. Engineering optimality, of course, is irrelevant
to causal responsibility cost assessment.
The Seventh Circuit, apparently, did not quite understand the railroads' objection or perhaps the court interpreted the objection in what
it thought was a charitable light. The railroads, according to the court,
were concerned about efficiency. 53 They anticipated that a potential
subsidizer might demand service that could be rendered at the lowest
total cost if the railroads undertook extensive rehabilitation. 54 Yet,
they worried that the potential subsidizer would insist, despite the fact
48. 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 (1977).
49. Id See 582 F.2d at 1053.
50. The costs of additional rehabilitation undertaken to satisfy the service demands of a potential subsidizer could only be included in the calculation of avoidable costs for the purpose of
determining whether a subsidy continuation offer is adequate.
51. 582 F.2d at 1053-54.
52. Brief of Railroad Petitioners, supra note 29, at 32-39.
53. 582 F.2d at 1053-54. The railroads probably hoped that each subsidizer would be required to finance extensive repairs so that they could then attract additional customers with improved service.
54. Id
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that it would bear the higher cost, that the railroads undertake only
55
limited rehabilitation and thereby incur extra operating expenses.
The railroads' concern was misplaced, observed the court, because the
railroads would be compensated, in any event, for all their avoidable
costs. 56 In a portion of the Seventh Circuit's opinion which seemed to
implicitly recognize the soundness of causal responsibility assessment,
the court rejected what it took to be the railroads' objection and upheld
57
the ICC's position.
Capital Equipment Costs
Assessing the costs of capital equipment like locomotives and
freight cars on the basis of causal responsibility is fairly complex, unlike making a similar assessment for deferred maintenance. To understand the proper methodology, one must initially grasp the general
theory of attributing capital equipment costs and then see how it applies in the calculation of the avoidable costs of continued branch line
service.
The general theory provides an analytical framework for deriving
an answer to the question: What additional capital equipment costs, if
any, must be suffered as a result of a decision to meet an increase in the
demand for service? The analysis turns on whether a "short-run" or
"long-run" perspective is adopted. The general theory, therefore, has
58
two distinct parts, one corresponding to each perspective.
Adopting a short-run perspective, one assumes that increases in
the level of service demanded will be accommodated with the capacity
available from existing capital equipment. Under that assumption, the
costs of the capital equipment are then the costs of using that capacity.
The nature of those costs depends on the relationship between capacity
and demand. On the one hand, as long as excess capacity exists, increases in the level of service demanded will inevitably lead to more
intensive equipment utilization. More intensive equipment utilization
will result in greater wear and tear. Greater wear and tear will impose
additional costs of future repair if the equipment is likely to be repaired
at all. Users whose consumption increases the demand for service are
completely responsible for the additional costs of repair. 59 On the
other hand, once capacity is exhausted, increases in the level of service
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.at 1054.
Id.
Id
See generally KAHN, supra note 3 1, at 70-75.
Id. at 71.
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demanded will necessarily put the enterprise in the position of having
too little equipment to meet the needs of all users. Some users will
have to postpone or do without service, which represents a real loss of
value, an opportunity cost. The more users that postpone or do without, the greater will be the opportunity costs. Users whose consumption increases the demand for service are responsible for those
opportunity costs in the same proportion that their actual use bears to
60
total use.
We can now apply the short-run perspective portion of the general
theory to a railroad's failure to abandon a branch line. The failure will
increase the demand for rail service above the level that would prevail
if the line were abandoned. To the extent that the railroad has excess
capacity, it will respond to that increase by utilizing some of its locomotives and freight cars to provide branch line service. That equipment will naturally suffer more wear and tear than it otherwise would.
More wear and tear will create a bigger need for future repair.
Whether that need is likely to be met is not at all clear. For example,
the railroad would probably not repair equipment that was unsuitable
for service elsewhere on its system if the railroad did not expect that
branch line operations would be continued for very long. 6' Still, if the
railroad is likely to undertake that repair, then the costs of that repair
should be included in the avoidable costs of continued branch line
services. To the extent that the railroad has exhausted capacity, however, it will be unable to utilize its locomotives and freight cars more
intensively. It will have to conduct branch line operations with equipment fully utilized. As a result, some shippers will have to delay or
forego rail service. Those shippers will sustain losses equal in value to
the prices they would have been willing to pay had they been served
promptly or at all. The losses--opportunity costs-will be imposed on
deprived shippers by other shippers actually served. These opportunity
costs should be included in the avoidable costs of continued branch line
service in the same proportion that branch line equipment use bears to
total use.
Calculated on the basis of a short-run perspective, the costs of using capacity are those of future repair and lost opportunity. Both types
of costs may be properly included in the avoidable costs of continuing
60. Id. at n.20.
61. The implication of the railroad petitioners' argument against the ICC's deferred maintenance regulations was that some of the equipment used on the branch lines would be unsuitable
for use on the main lines. See Brief of Railroad Petitioners, supra note 29, at 32-39. See generally
KAHN, supra note 31, at 73.
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service over many branch lines since, during the continuation period,
demand will vary seasonally while the railroad's capacity will remain
fixed.
We have not yet considered all the capital equipment costs that
may be suffered as a result of a decision to meet increases in the demand for service. Our omission stems from the assumption that such
increases would be accommodated with the capacity available from existing capital equipment. In fact, it may cause an enterprise, like a railroad, to expand capacity through the acquisition of additional capital
equipment. The cost of capital equipment then becomes the cost of
expanding capacity, including both investment and return on investment. 62 We now account for those costs by adopting a long-run perspective.
An enterprise will not expand capacity in response to every increase in the demand for service. It is quite clear, for example, that
expansion will not be undertaken in response to a non-repeating, temporary increase. It may not be as clear, but it is far more significant,
that expansion will also not be undertaken in response to an "off-peak"
increase. To illustrate, consider the likely response of a Florida electric
power utility to the decisions of most of its customers to install attic
fans in their homes for spring and fall cooling. Note that the utility's
existing generating capacity would be designed to meet the voracious
demands of homeowners who operate their air-conditioners during
summer afternoons and evenings, the peak demand periods. The decisions to install attic fans would undoubtedly increase the demand for
electricity. But the increase would be completely off-peak. Spring and
fall demand, even inflated by attic fan cooling, would still be less than
summer afternoon and evening demand. Existing generating capacity
would easily handle the off-peak increase. The utility would have no
reason to expand. An enterprise will expand capacity only in response
to an on-peak increase in the demand for service that is likely to be
sustained.
For another example, consider the response of the same utility to
the unanticipated decision of several entrepreneurs to open an air-conditioned shopping mall within its franchise area. The decision to open
the mall, like the decisions to install attic fans, would increase the demand for electricity. But this increase would be, in part, "on-peak".
Summer afternoon and evening demand, enlarged by mall air-conditioning, might threaten to overwhelm the company's capacity. To
62. See generally KAHN, supra note 31, at 88-89.
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avoid "brown-outs" or even "black-outs", the utility could be expected
to acquire additional generating facilities. It is customer purchases
during the peak periods, then, that will cause an enterprise to expand
capacity. 63 Assuming that capacity may be used interchangeably to
provide on- and off-peak service, it is peak consumption that is completely responsible for all the costs of expansion. Those are the costs of
acquiring additional capital equipment and include the costs of financing the acquisition.
We can now apply the long-run perspective portion of the general
theory to a railroad's failure to abandon a branch line. The failure, as
previously noted, would increase the demand for rail service above the
level that would prevail if the line were abandoned. We could expect
the increase to be partly on-peak and partly off-peak because the railroad, if it is like most, will experience seasonal demand peaks while
branch line service is continued throughout the year. The on-peak
branch line service, along with all the other on-peak service, could
cause the railroad to expand capacity. Assuming that capacity can be
64
used interchangeably to provide both on- and off-peak service, it
would be the peak service that would be completely responsible for all
the costs of expansion. Those would be the costs of future purchases or
leases of additional locomotives and freight cars and would include the
costs of financing those transactions. Those costs should be included in
the avoidable cost of continued branch line service in the same proportion that on-peak branch line service bears to total on-peak service.
These applications of the general theory of attributing capital
equipment costs on the basis of causal responsibility will serve as comparative guides in the evaluation of the ICC's regulations for assessing
avoidable locomotive and freight car costs. These applications are authoritative guides because they are consistent, as previously shown,
with the function and language of section la and its tilt toward efficiency. Consider first the ICC regulations that provide that avoidable
costs would include the original cost of locomotives and cars apportioned to the branch line on the basis of locomotive-hours or car-miles
of use and to the subsidy continuation period on the basis of straight63. Id. at 89. It is difficult to identify those periods that should be considered peak because
they may shift over time. They may shift in response to the imposition of all capacity costs on
consumption during particular periods or they may shift because of changes in living patterns and
available technology. Consumption at all peak periods should bear responsibility for capacity
costs, apportioned on the basis of the intensities and elasticities of demand during the various
period. Id at 89-94.
64. The costs of capacity used only for on-peak service must be attributed differently. Id. at
89, 97-98.
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line depreciation accounting. 65
These "original cost" regulations are subject to two alternative interpretations. They may have constituted the ICC's attempt to account
for the greater wear and tear on locomotives and freight cars that might
be caused by continued branch line service, as did the correct application of the short-run perspective part of the general theory. If so, as
"cost-of-capacity-use" regulations, they were badly flawed. They were
either fashioned in a completely arbitrary and capricious manner or,
granting the ICC the benefit of the doubt, based on four erroneous assumptions. The first assumption may be deduced from the ICC's failure to account for opportunity costs. Recall that such opportunity costs
would be incurred if the railroad serving the line exhausted its hauling
capacity. The ICC must have assumed that every railroad proposing
branch line abandonments would experience constant excess capacity.
The ICC thus ignored opportunity costs and accounted only for the
other type of short run costs, the costs of additional future repairs. It
accounted for them on the basis of straight-line depreciation accounting, a convention that reflects the idea that capital equipment loses its
value in equal increments during its useful life. The second and third
assumptions are implicit in the use of that convention. The ICC must
have assumed that wear and tear on locomotives and freight cars occurs uniformly during their useful lives. It must have also assumed that
only wear and tear, and not technological obsolescence, causes such
equipment to decline in value, to depreciate. The regulations provided
that the costs of additional future repairs, accounted for on the basis of
straight-line depreciation, were to be considered avoidable whether or
not the railroad proposing abandonment was likely to incur them. The
fourth assumption may be inferred from the unconditional nature of
the regulations. The ICC must have assumed that railroads always undertake repairs to remedy past wear and tear. Cost-of-capacity-use regulations based on these erroneous assumptions would tend to generate
cost assessments that would vary from the principle of causal responsibility, and would be, therefore, of questionable propriety.
It is possible, alternatively, that the original cost regulations constituted the ICC's attempt to account for the acquisition of additional locomotives and freight cars that might be caused, in part, by continued
branch line service, as did the correct application of the long-run perspective part of the general theory. If so, as "cost-of-capacity-acquisiton" regulations, they suffered from two inexcusable errors. One,
65. 49 C.F.R. §§ 1121.42(c)(4), 1121.42(1), 1121.42(m) (1977). See notes 40-43 supra.
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the regulations required equipment valuation at the original cost of existing equipment rather than the expected cost of to-be-acquired equipment. Two, they reflected absolutely no consideration of coincident
peak load demand. Moreover, the regulations rested on transparent
post hoc ergo prop/er hoc reasoning. The reasoning appears to have
been as follows: the ICC observed that branch line service would be
continued during a given time period and, at the end of the same period, the railroad's accountants would account for a portion of the cost
of existing locomotives and freight cars. The ICC then fallaciously
concluded that continued branch line service caused the railroad to suffer that portion of the cost. Cost-of-capacity-acquisition regulations
plagued by such errors and based on such illogic could not possibly
generate cost assessments that would bear any perceptible relationship
to the principle of causal responsibility. They would be, therefore,
66
completely unacceptable.
Financing of Capital Acquisitions
Now consider the less ambiguous "rate of return" regulations.
They provided that avoidable costs would include the return required
on the investment in locomotives and cars to be used on the branch line
as measured by the interest rates applicable to the most recent equipment trust certificates, conditional sales agreements or equipment lease
agreements entered into by the railroad for the purchase or lease of
such equipment. 67 The rate of return regulations, like the correct application of the long-run perspective portion of the general theory, accounted for financing the purchase or lease of additional locomotives
and freight cars that might be caused by continued branch line service.
The two were not identical, however, for the regulations were based on
present financing costs while the application was based on future
financing costs. The discrepancy, if substantial, might have caused the
rate of return regulations to generate cost assessments not entirely in
66. The ICC could have attempted to justify its regulations on the ground that they were
more administrable than ones consistent with the principle of causal responsibility. It could have
pointed out, for example, that its regulations could have been implemented using available cost
data whereas regulations consistent with the principle of causal responsibility could not. The
attempted justification would not have been misplaced (assuming that control of abandonment
decisions is itself defensible). If the costs had outweighed the gains of implementing economically
sound regulations, the ICC would have been quite justified in refusing to adopt them. The ICC,
in fact, did not offer any such justification. And since it made no inquiry into the costs and
benefits of implementing economically sound regulations, one cannot know whether it should
have. Had such a justification been offered, however, it might have provided valuable ammunition to those Congressmen, bureaucrats and academicians who favor pruning, if not rooting out,
railroad regulation.
67. 49 C.F.R. §§ 1121.42(c)(6)(iv), 1121.43(l)(3) (1977). See notes 40-43 supra.
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accord with the principle of causal responsibility. These regulations,
then, like the original cost regulations, also could have been found to
be deficient.
Thus, a reviewing court could have properly invalidated any or all
of the ICC's regulations for assessing avoidable locomotive and freight
car costs on the ground that they varied unjustifiably from the correct
applications of the general theory and, therefore, were inconsistent with
section 1a. Alternatively, it could have invalidated at least some of the
regulations on grounds relating to the perspective-short-run or longrun-upon which the regulations were based. A reviewing court could
have held that the ICC abused its discretion by adopting the wrong
perspective or that the ICC failed to engage in reasoned decision-making by failing to adopt any perspective.
Recall that the general theory tells us how to attribute capital
68 It
equipment costs using either a long-run or short-run perspective.
does not tell us, however, which perspective to adopt for assessing the
costs of any particular business decision. The choice of perspective
ought to turn on consideration of a number of factors, including the
probable impact of the decision, the time interval associated with the
capital acquisition process, the durability of the equipment, the volatility of short-run costs and the predictability of long-run costs. 69 It is a
choice that requires the exercise of informed judgment.
Consider, for example, this hypothetical case. A potential subsidizer wishes to have a railroad continue service over a branch line that
has been certified for abandonment. The subsidizer is interested in
service continuation for only one year and the ICC has determined that
it will not delay abandonment for a longer period. 70 With such a short
time horizon for branch line service, it might be predicted that the railroad would ignore that service in making and implementing a multiyear plan for the acquisition of long-wearing locomotives and freight
cars. If it were so predicted, it would be appropriate to adopt a shortrun perspective for assessing the avoidable locomotive and freight car
costs of continued branch line service. Indeed, in the absence of countervailing considerations, a court could very well deem the adoption of
68. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
69. KAHN supra note 31, at 83-89.
70. That the ICC might choose to delay abandonment for a longer period is made clear by
regulations reserving the ICC's "right to reopen ... an abandonment. . . proceeding to consider,
among other things, any change in circumstance resulting from a financial assistance program
which might reflect upon the merits of the abandonment. . . application." 49 C.F.R. § 1121.38(1)
(1977).
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a long-run perspective an abuse of discretion and strike down all regulations based on it. Cases like this hypothetical one, or others similarly
calling for the adoption of a short-run perspective, could well predominate in the real world. If they did, a reviewing court could then
strike down as improperly based on a long-run perspective the rate of
return regulations and the original cost regulations, if it interpreted the
latter as the ICC's attempt to account for the acquisition of additional
locomotives and freight cars.
Unfortunately, it appears that the ICC did not exercise informed
judgment in choosing a perspective. The ICC's report accompanying
its regulations reveals no consideration of any of the factors that ought
to have borne on its choice. 7' In fact, the report reveals no consideration of the choice at all. The ICC may have simply failed to choose a
perspective; it may not have exercised any judgment, informed or uninformed. This view of what the ICC did is supported by the glaring
inconsistencies among the regulations, however they might be interpreted. It would be inconsistent, for example, to include in avoidable
costs the present costs of financing capital acquisitions but only the past
costs of acquiring it. Yet, that would have been the effect of the rate of
return regulations and the original cost regulations if the latter were
interpreted as an attempt to account for the acquisition of additional
locomotives and freight cars. It would have been equally inconsistent,
for another example, to account at all for the financing of additional
capital acquisitions while failing to account for any of the costs of acquisition. Yet, that would have been the effect of the rate of return
regulations and the original cost regulations if the latter were interpreted as an attempt to account for greater wear and tear on capital
equipment. The ICC's failure to choose a perspective impugns the
soundness of all of its regulations for assessing the avoidable locomotive and freight car costs of continued branch line service. A reviewing
court could have properly struck them down as not being the product
of reasoned decision-making.
The Seventh Circuit'sApproach
The Seventh Circuit, the reviewing court in Chicago& North Western TransportationCo., invalidated the ICC's regulations for assessing
avoidable locomotive and freight car costs. 7 2 In so doing, however, the
Seventh Circuit did not rely on any of the proper grounds. Instead, the
71. See ICC Abandonment Regulations Report, supra note 29.
72. 582 F.2d at 1053.
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court relied on grounds that were wholly unrelated to the economic
function of section la. In striking down the original cost regulations,
the court relied on a mechanical reading of an abstruse clause in section la.73 The Seventh Circuit tried to bolster that reading with a
strained interpretation of the testimony of one railroad-employee witness given before the Senate committee that considered the legislation
74
which eventually became section la.
Recall that section la contains a rather unenlightening description
of avoidable costs. 75 Section la provides that avoidable costs are to be
assessed in accordance with the principle of causal responsibility and
that such costs are to include: working capital and required capital expenditures, expenditures to eliminate deferred maintenance, the current
76
costs of locomotives and cars, and certain tax benefits.
The Seventh Circuit relied upon the "current cost" clause in striking down the original cost regulations. 77 It is difficult to ascertain the
meaning of the current cost clause because, unlike the other clauses, it
refers to a measure of value rather than an item. Moreover, the clause
itself is vague. It tells us to measure capital equipment costs in the
period for which the assessment is made, but it does not tell us which
costs of what equipment to measure. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit
found the current cost clause not only relevant but dispositive of the
issue raised. The court, with the aid of counsel, 78 incorrectly framed
that issue as:
[Wihether in determining avoidable cost [in accordance with section
la] the depreciation cost for locomotives, freight cars, and other
equipment attributable to branch line service should be based on (a)
the original or book cost of that equipment or (b) the cost that could
be avoided if the service were terminated and the equipment used
elsewhere
on the railroad, i.e., the cost of purchasing new equip79
ment.

As previously indicated, 80 the real issue in Chicago & North Western TransportationCo. was whether the ICC's regulations for assessing
73. Id at 1050.
74. Id at 1051.
75. See note 83 infra and accompanying text.
76. 49 U.S.C. § la(l 1)(a) (1976) (current version at id. § 10905(a)(1) (Supp. 1979)) (emphasis
added).
77. 582 F.2d at 1050-53.
78. See Brief of Railroad Petitioners, supra note 29, at 28-32; Brief of the Respondent Interstate Commerce Commission at 16-20, Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. United States,
582 F.2d 1043 (7th Cir. 1978). The Department of Justice filed a brief but it did not address itself
to the avoidable cost regulations.
79. 582 F.2d at 1050.
80. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
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the avoidable locomotive and freight car costs of continued branch line
service were consistent with the general theory of attributing capital
equipment costs on the basis of causal responsibility as required by section 1a. By framing the issue incorrectly, the court both begged the
question and insulated two crucial aspects of the ICC's regulations
from review. The court begged the question by assuming that the capital equipment "cost that would be avoided if the service were terminated" would be the "cost of purchasing new equipment." 8 1 That
assumption would be correct only if a long-run perspective were
adopted and all branch line service were "on-peak." In addition, the
court insulated from review the ICC's method for attributing costs to
the branch line and the use of depreciation as a measure of the costs of
capacity use or capacity acquisition. It did so by implicitly accepting
them as appropriate. Unfortunately, the ICC's method for branch line
cost attribution would be appropriate only if a short-run perspective
were adopted and constant excess capacity assumed; the use of depreciation as a capacity cost measure would never be appropriate, because it
is not accurate.
Since the issue, as incorrectly framed, raised problems of the valuation of locomotives and freight cars, it appeared to the court that the
current cost clause bore on its resolution. 82 The clause, however, is ambiguous since "the current cost of capital equipment" might refer to
any one of at least three valuations. First, the clause might refer to that
portion of the original purchase costs of existing equipment currently
allocable to the subsidy/continuation period pursuant to any of a host
of standard accounting conventions. Second, it might refer to the current costs that would be incurred if existing equipment were replaced,
presumably allocated in some unspecified but arbitrary manner to the
branch line and to the subsidy/continuation period. Third, it might
refer to that portion of the costs of future purchases of additional
equipment for which branch line service during the subsidy/continuation period would be currently causally responsible. The
clause has no "natural" meaning, despite the Seventh Circuit's claim to
the contrary. It should have been interpreted in light of the economic
function of section 1a. Then, the clause would have been read as referring to the third valuation, the cost of future purchases. It was not so
read. Rather, the court read the clause as referring to the second valua-

81. 582 F.2d at 1050.
82. Id at 1050-53.
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tion because in ascertaining its meaning the court ignored the economic
function of section 1a and relied on the statute's legislative history.
In reviewing that lengthy legislative history, the Seventh Circuit
focused on the testimony of one J. H. Williams, then manager of the
Bureau of Transportation Research of Southern Pacific Transportation
Company, before the United States Commerce Committee. 83 The principal subject of Williams' testimony was the subsidy that a potential
subsidizer should be required to pay in return for continued service
over a branch line that a railroad had proposed for abandonment. It
was Williams' position that the required subsidy should be equal to the
difference between the expected branch line revenues and the "fully
allocated costs" of branch line service plus a reasonable return on the
economic value of the branch line. By fully allocated costs, Williams
apparently meant the sum of variable costs and an arbitrarily assigned
portion of fixed costs. 84 Variable costs, costs that vary with the amount
of service rendered, correspond roughly to those costs for which the
branch line service, if continued, would be causally responsible in the
short-run. Fixed costs, costs that do not vary with the amount of service rendered, correspond roughly to those costs for which no currently
offered service would be causally responsible in the short-run. Since
fully allocated costs would always be greater than the costs for which
branch line service, if continued, would be causally responsible, the
subsidy that Williams would have required would have always been
greater than that required pursuant to section 1a.
Williams suggested a statute governing abandonment that would
have been consistent with his position on the required subsidy.85 One
86
part of that statute described how to calculate branch line revenues.
83. Id. at 1051. The United States Senate Commerce Committee was considering the legislation which eventually became section Ia. Railroads-1975,HearingsBefore the Senate Committee
on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 795-807 (1975) [hereinafter cited as "4-R Act" Hearings].
84. Id. at 796, 804-07.
85. Id. at 807. It is possible that Williams did not realize that the "fully distributed cost"
standard was economically unsound, but it seems more likely that he was simply biased. Yet, the
source of his bias is not at once clear. His superiors at Southern Pacific certainly did not use the
"fully distributed cost" standard in selecting the lines they would propose for abandonment. Had
they used it, they might well have selected some lines that were contributing to the company's net
revenues, lines for which marginal revenues exceeded marginal costs but not fully distributed
costs. Abandoning such lines would have tended to impoverish the company. So why did Williams try to persuade the Congress to enact the fully distributed cost standard into law? Perhaps
the answer lies in the fact that abandonment does not occur unless a railroad proposes it. There is
no danger that a railroad will be forced to abandon a line if it does not wish to do so. If it does
wish to do so, however, it wants administrative scrutiny of its decision to be as lax as possible.
Had Williams succeeded, then, his superiors at Southern Pacific would have been permitted wide
managerial discretion in arriving at abandonment decisions.
86. Id. at 807.
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A second part described how to calculate fully allocated costs. 87 Finally, a third part described how to calculate a reasonable return on the
economic value of the branch line. 88 The third part provided that the
ICC would make the calculation in the traditional manner, multiplying
the value of the rate base by the appropriate rate of return. The suggested statute also provided, however, that the ICC would value the
rate base in a rather untraditional manner, at its market value, not original value less depreciation. 89 The rate base would thus include, but
not be limited to: the market value of land; salvage; the tax benefit
from retirement; the current cost offreight cars and locomotives; working capital; required capital expenditures; and expenditures to eliminate deferred maintenance. 90 Valuing the rate base at its market value
is a form of replacement cost valuation. This form of valuation is
plagued by numerous practical problems which have been well-documented. 9 1 Section la contains no directive controlling the calculation
of the reasonable return on the value of the branch line.
The Congress, in enacting section la, apparently rejected Williams' position on the required subsidy, rejected his suggested statute,
and rejected replacement cost valuation of the rate base. Congress did,
however, use some language in section la similar to some of the language used by Williams in his suggested statute. Among the similar
language was the phrase "current cost of freight cars and locomotives."
In section 1a, the language was used in the context of describing avoidable costs; in Williams' suggested statute, the language was used in the
context of describing the calculation of a reasonable return on the economic value of the branch line.
The Seventh Circuit seized on this similarity in language as the
key to deciphering the current cost clause.92 The court interpreted the
clause as meaning what Williams had intended it to mean. Thus, the
Seventh Circuit ascribed to the clause a meaning given to it in an entirely different context by one railroad employee witness whose testimony was, in substance, completely rejected by the Congress. 93 The
87.

Id

88. Id
89.

Id

90. Id
91. See KAHN, supra note 31, at 109-16. See also J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
UTILITY RATES 224-37 (1961).

92. 582 F.2d at 1052.
93. In a feeble effort to support this interpretation of the "current cost" clause, the court
noted that Senator Hartke, the Senator who presided at the time Williams testified, called Williams "one of the bright minds in this business." Id. at 1051 n.12, quoting from "4-R Act" Hearings, supra note 83 at 797. Senator Hartke asked Williams how the Congress could guarantee that
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court, therefore, improperly read the clause as referring to the current
costs that would be incurred if the existing equipment were replaced
(allocated to the branch line on the basis of use and to the subsidy/continuation period on the basis of straight-line depreciation accounting). Since the ICC's original cost regulations were inconsistent
with the clause as so read, the court struck them down. 94 The Seventh
Circuit could have reached the identical result by testing the regulations against the economic function of section 1a. Had the court done
so, its decision would have been based on a proper ground.
The court in Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. also
struck down the ICC's rate of return regulations, 95 but the basis of its
disposition is not readily apparent. The court did develop a fixed view
about the return on a railroad's investment in locomotives and freight
cars that should be included in avoidable costs: the return should equal
the railroad's overall cost of financing capital, a weighted average of
interest on debt and earnings on equity. 96 Why it developed this view
is not evident from the court's opinion. The court did note the ICC's
a
observation, made in its report accompanying the regulations, that' 97
"railroad should receive a return on the equity in its rolling stock."
Receiving a return, however, is not necessarily the same as receiving a
return equal to the railroad's overall cost of financing capital. Moreover, the ICC's observation, a response to the filings of the railroads
who were petitioners on appeal, could hardly be considered an authoritative interpretation of section la.
The Seventh Circuit's view was, in fact, inconsistent with section
la in that it ignored the limits of both the principle of causal responsibility and the language of the statute. The principle of causal responsibility limits avoidable financing costs to those made necessary by
continued branch line service. The language of the statute limits avoidable financing costs to those incident to the acquisition of locomotives
and freight cars. The costs of financing the acquisition of locomotives
and freight cars made necesary by continued branch line service, the
railroads invest in railroad enterprises rather than other ventures. Williams quite correctly replied
that, absent expropriation, the only way to guarantee reinvestment was to make sure that the
return on investments in railroad enterprises was competitive with the return on investments in
other ventures. Apparently not understanding a word of Williams' reply, Senator Hartke rejoined: "Well, think about that. You are one of the bright minds in this business. Maybe you can
give us suggestions." "4-R Act" Hearings, supra note 83, at 797.
94. 582 F.2d at 1052-53.
95. Id at 1054-56.
96. Id at 1055 n.23.
97. Id at 1055, quoting ICC Abandonment Regulations Report, supra note 29, at 77.
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only capital financing costs lawfully considered avoidable, would likely
be different than the railroad's overall cost of financing capital.
The difference would stem in part from the fact that the costs of
financing different investments vary with investment risk. Two important determinants of that risk, as the ICC pointed out, 9 8 are the nature
of the collateral that secures the investment and the length of the repayment period. Locomotives and freight cars are excellent collateral because they can be readily repossessed and resold and the repayment
period for investments in such equipment is usually shorter than its
anticipated life. 99 These favorable determinants make investing in locomotives and freight cars less risky, and thus less costly, than investing
in other railroad capital.' °° The difference would also stem from the
fact that continued branch line service, to the extent that it would be
on-peak, would make necessary future, not present, equipment acquisitions. It would, therefore, be causally responsible for the future financing costs of those acquisitions, not the present average financing costs
of all railroad capital.' 01 Since the court's view was itself inconsistent
with section la, the court should not have struck down the ICC's rate of
return regulations as inconsistent with that view. Once again, however,
the court could have made the same disposition, based on a proper
ground, had it evaluated the regulations in the light of the economic
function of section 1a.
By making the right decisions about the ICC's avoidable cost regulations for the wrong reasons, the court in Chicago & North Western
TransportationCo. sent signals to the ICC which could very well lead
the agency, on remand, to promulgate regulations inconsistent with the
function and language of section 1a. Such regulations, besides frustrating the will of Congress, would tend to promote inefficiency, much to
the detriment of the general consuming public.
Regulatory Response to Failure to Reach a Subsidy/Continuation
Agreement
According to section 1a, the ICC initially decides whether to au98. Id. at 76-77.
99. Id
100. Id at 77.
101. If the court had adopted the view that the return should equal the present costs of financing the acquisition of locomotives and freight cars, then it would have been compelled to uphold
the regulations. As a measure of those present costs, the interest rate on the most recent debt
instruments ordinarily used for their acquisition, the standard used by the ICC, would be far
superior to the railroad's overall cost of financing capital.
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thorize a proposed branch line abandonment. i0 2 The ICC then decides
whether a subsidy, if offered, is likely to compensate a railroad for the
difference between the avoidable costs and expected revenues of continued branch line service and provide a reasonable return on the value
of the branch line. Finally, it decides, if the subsidy offered is deemed
adequate, how long to postpone issuing its certificate authorizing abandonment. The ICC may postpone issuance for up to six months in order to give the potential subsidizer and the railroad an opportunity to
negotiate a continuation agreement.' 0 3 Once the ICC makes its last decision, however, it is up to the parties to reach a subsidy/continuation
agreement. If they fail to reach one in the period permitted, the ICC
has no power under section la to do anything but make its certificate
effective. Nevertheless, in the regulations setting forth its responses to
such a failure, the ICC provided that it could not only make its certificate effective but that it could also reopen the abandonment proceeding, direct the carrier to continue to provide rail freight service for a
rate of compensation determined by the ICC or take any other appropriate action.'°4
These regulations were obviously inconsistent with the language of
section I a which expressly restricted the period of postponement to no
more than six months. 10 5 The inconsistency was so obvious that even
the ICC recognized it and tried to explain it away.' 0 6 The ICC's explanation consisted of the following. Failure to reach a subsidy/
continuation agreement substantially changes the circumstances upon
which the decision to authorize abandonment was premised. The ICC
07
may, pursuant to section 17(9)(g) of the Interstate Commerce Act,
reopen any proceeding if it finds "material error, new evidence, or substantially changed circumstances." 0 8 Thus, argued the ICC, although
the regulations may be inconsistent with section l a, they are consistent
102. 49 U.S.C. § la (1976) (current version at id. § 10905(b) (Supp. 1979)).
103. Id
104. The ICC regulations provided, in pertinent part, to:
Reopen the underlying abandonment. . . proceeding to reevaluate the application on its
merits in light of the . . . financial assistance offer; [d]irect the carrier to continue to
provide rail freight service for an additional year in return for compensation to be computed by the Commission . . . in accordance with [certain standards] . . . or. . . [take
whatever action is appropriate to the particular situation and in conformity with section
Ia of the act. Such action may include but not be limited to setting the matter for arbitration subject to the final review of the Commission.
49 C.F.R. § 1121.38(i)(2) (1977).
105. 49 U.S.C. § la(6)(a)(ii)(B) (1976).
106. ICC Abandonment Regulations Report, supra note 29, at 41-44.
107. 49 U.S.C. § 17(9)(g) (1976).
108. Id. (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 10327(g) (Supp. 1979)).
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with section 17(9)(g).' 0 9
The Seventh Circuit in Chicago & North Western Transportation

Co. also recognized that the regulations were inconsistent with section
l a. The court highlighted that inconsistency by pointing out that section la, unlike the comparable section of the previously controlling Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, contained no provisions
prohibiting abandonment as long as a reasonable subsidy/continuation
offer was outstanding. ' 0 Highlighting the inconsistency did not, of
course, blunt the force of the ICC's explanation of it. Unfortunately,
the court responded to that explanation with a non sequitur. The court
observed that the ICC's decision to authorize abandonment had to be
made, by virtue of section la's two-stage process and the ICC's own
regulations, I' before the ICC considered any subsidy offer and without
regard to the probability that one might be forthcoming." 2 From that
observation, the court deduced that the failure to reach a subsidy/continuation agreement could not be a "changed circumstance"
that would justify a reopening of the abandonment authorization proceeding. "13

The court's deduction did not follow from its observation. A decision to authorize abandonment would be based, in part, on the ICC's
finding that the losses that would be caused by an order to continue
branch line service would exceed the gains engendered by it. Those
losses would be the unreimbursed costs of providing the service. A
subsidy, if accepted, would reduce those unreimbursed costs. If a railroad rejected a subsidy, it would be choosing, in a sense, to suffer some
of those unreimbursed costs. The ICC could reasonably take the view
that the unreimbursed costs that the railroad chose to suffer should not
be counted among the losses that would be caused by an order to continue branch line service. If the ICC took that view, it could well find
that the scaled down losses no longer exceeded the gains. Thus, a railroad's rejection of a subsidy offer could undermine the basis of the
ICC's initial decision to authorize abandonment. Anything that could
undermine the basis of the ICC's decision would certainly constitute a
"changed circumstance."
Had the Seventh Circuit analyzed the regulations in terms of the
109. 582 F.2d at 1049.
110. Id.
111. 49 C.F.R. § 1121.38(h)(3) (1977) provides, in pertinent part:
The Commission shall not consider an offer of financial assistance or any resulting
agreement in making its initial finding on the merits of abandonment. . . application[s].
112. 582 F.2d at 1049.
113. Id.
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economic function of the six-month restriction, the Court could have
reached the identical result without resorting to any logical fallacies.
Restricting the period of postponement to six months strikes a balance
between the losses and gains attributable to continuing branch line
service during the postponement period. The losses would be the unreimbursed costs of the service rendered during that period and the
gains would be the possibility that the negotiations conducted during
that period would result in continued service offered on a financially
sound basis. If the period of postponement were longer than six
months, a distinct possibility under the regulations, the relationship between losses and gains would likely be altered. Altering that relationship would be inconsistent with the balance struck by the six month
restriction. It is rather unlikely that the Congress intended the balance
struck by section la to be subject to upset by the ICC's exercise of its
long ago granted power to reopen proceedings. The ICC's regulations,
under this analysis, were unquestionably invalid.
DISCONTINUATION OF RAIL COMMUTER SERVICE

To maximize profits for its owners, a business organization must
respond efficiently to changes in the marketplace. Hence, a business
organization must cease offering those services for which consumers are
no longer willing to pay the costs. In that context, consider Consolidated Rail Corporation," 4 the corporate "phoenix" fashioned by the
Congress from the ashes of about a dozen bankrupt railroads that once
served the Northeast and industrial Midwest. Conrail, a for-profit railroad,'1 5 is supposed to earn its profit primarily by hauling freight and,
secondarily, by providing some of the commuter services that its corporate predecessors provided. But Conrail has yet to do what it is supposed to do. Conrail's yearly revenues, the sum of payments made to it
by shippers, passengers, and local governments that subsidized operations, have never matched its yearly operating costs and the federal
government has compensated for the shortfalls.' 16 To do what it is supposed to do--earn, if not maximize, profits for its owners--Conrail
must respond efficiently to changes in the transportation market. In
particular, Conrail must discontinue commuter rail service for which
passengers, along with local governments that subsidize operations, are
no longer willing to pay the costs. Unfortunately, in Illinois v. Consoli114. Hereinafter referred to as Conrail.
115. 45 U.S.C. § 741(b) (Supp. 1979).
116. Wall Street Journal, Oct. 6, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
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dated Rail Corp.,' ,7 the Seventh Circuit sharply limited Conrail's ability to do just that.
Illinois v. ConsolidatedRail Corp.
The case arose out of Conrail's attempt to discontinue commuter
rail service between Valparaiso, Indiana, and Chicago, Illinois. Commuters in Valparaiso have long traveled by train to and from their
places of work in Chicago. They had been unwilling, however, since18
April 1, 1976, if not before, to pay for all of the costs of the service."
On that date, Conrail acquired the assets that the Penn Central Railroad" 9 had been using to render the Valparaiso-Chicago service and
began to render the service itself.' 20 For one-hundred and eighty days
following the asset acquisition, Conrail was obligated to continue service under 45 U.S.C. § 744(e)(1).' 2 1 During that period, Conrail was
compensated for the passenger revenue shortfall by the Secretary of
Transportation. 122 For about two years following the mandatory operating period, Conrail agreed to continue service pursuant to successive
contracts with three Indiana transportation agencies. 23 During those
two years, Conrail was compensated for the passenger revenue shortfall
by the three agencies, all of which disbursed federal matching funds.
Thus, from April 1, 1976, through September 30, 1978, Conrail continued the Penn Central's Valparaiso-Chicago commuter rail service without sustaining a loss.
117. 589 F.2d 1327 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2884 (1979).
118. Between April I, 1976, and September 30, 1978, Conrail received subsidies to compensate
it for the difference between the passenger revenues derived from and the avoidable costs associated with Valparaiso-Chicago service. Conrail has claimed, and no one has seriously disputed,
that it has provided the service from October I, 1978 at a loss. It is therefore reasonable to deduce
that since April I, 1976, Valparaiso commuters have been unwilling to pay for all of the costs they
impose by traveling to and from Chicago by train.
119. Hereinafter referred to as Penn Central.
120. Section 742 gave Conrail the power to acquire rail properties and section 743 outlined the
methods for valuation and conveyance. 45 U.S.C. §§ 742, 743 (1976).
121. 45 U.S.C. § 744(e)(1) (1976) requires:
Rail passenger service.-(l) The Corporation (or a profitable railroad) shall provide rail
passenger service for a period of 180 days immediately following the date of conveyance
(pursuant to section 743(b)( I) of this title), with respect to any rail properties over which
a railroad in reorganization in the region, or a person leased, operated, or controlled by
such a railroad, was providing rail passenger service immediately prior to such date of
conveyance. Such service shall be provided on such properties regardless of whether or
not such properties are designated in the final system plan as rail properties over which
rail service is required to be operated, except with respect to properties over which such
service is provided by the National Railroad Passenger Corporation.
122. 45 U.S.C. § 744(e)(5)(A) (1976).
123. The three agencies were the Northwestern Indiana Passenger Transportation authority,
the Public Service Commission of Indiana, and the Northwestern Indiana Regional Transportation Authority. Illinois v. Consolidated Rail Corp., No. 78 C 3768, mem. op. at 2 (N.D. Ill. Oct.
10, 1978).
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In 1978, it became clear that the last subsidy/continuation contract
would not be renewed or replaced. In response, Conrail announced, on
August 1, 1978, that it intended to discontinue the service as of October
1, 1978, pursuant to the notice procedures under 45 U.S.C. §§ 744(a)(1)
and 744(e). 124 To enjoin the discontinuance, the State of Illinois, the
Illinois Commerce Commission, the City of Chicago, the Chicago-Indiana Railroad Commuter Association, and two individuals brought suit
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 25 The plaintiffs claimed that Conrail could not discontinue the
Valparaiso-Chicago service pursuant to the notice procedures of 45
U.S.C. §§ 744(a)(1) and 744(e), but only pursuant to approval by the
Interstate Commerce Commission or state regulatory agencies under 49
'
U.S.C. § 10908. 126
Applicability of Sections 744(a)(1) and 744(e)
Section 744(a)(1) is a rather simple, relatively clear statute originally enacted as part of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of
1973.27 In pertinent part, section 744(a)(1) authorizes a railroad to discontinue a category of unsubsidized, unprofitable commuter rail service
by notifying specified individuals and groups of its intentions and supporting data sixty days in advance. 28 The category is service rendered
124. 45 U.S.C. §§ 744(a)(1), 744(e) (Supp. 1979).
125. Illinois v. Consolidated Rail Corp., No. 78 C 3768 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 1978).
126. 49 U.S.C. § 10908 (1979) (a reenactment of what was, at the time the Seventh Circuit
published its opinion, section 13(a) of the Interstate Commerce Act of February 4, 1887 ch. 104, 24
Stat. 379, § 13(a)(l), amended Act of Aug. 12, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-625, § 5, 72 Stat. 571).
127. 45 U.S.C. § 701 (1976); Act of Jan. 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-236, 87 Stat. 985.
128. Section 744(a)(1) provides:
Discontinuance.-(l) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (f) of this section, rail
service on rail properties of a railroad in reorganization in the region, or of a person
leased, operated, or controlled by such a railroad, which transfers to the Corporation or
to profitable railroads operating in the region all or substantially all of its rail properties
designated for such conveyance in the final system plan, and rail service on rail properties of a profitable railroad operating in the region which transfers substantially all of its
rail properties to the Corporation or to other railroads pursuant to the final system plan,
may be discontinued, to the extent such discontinuance is not precluded by the terms of
the leases and agreements referred to in section 743(b)(2) of this title, if(A) the final system plan does not designate rail service to be operated over
such rail properties;
(B) not sooner than 30 days following the effective date of the final system
p lan, the trustee or trustees of the applicable railroad in reorganization or a profitable railroad give notice in writing of intent to discontinue such service on a date
certain which is not less than 60 days after the date of such notice or on the date of
any conveyance ordered by the special court pursuant to section 743(b)(1) of this
title, whichever is later; and
(C) the notice required by subparagraph (B) of this paragraph is sent by certified mail to the Commission; to the chief executive officer, the transportation agencies, and the government of each political subdivision of each State in which such
rail properties are located; and to each shipper who has used such rail service during
the previous 12 months.
45 U.S.C. § 744(a)(1) (1976).
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over properties excluded from the final system plan, a document prepared by the United States Railway Association and approved, in general, by Congress. 129 Section 744(a)(1), in and of itself, was not
applicable to Conrail's attempt to discontinue Valparaiso-Chicago
service. The service was, as of October 1, 1978, unsubsidized and unprofitable and Conrail gave the required notice, but the properties over
which the service was rendered were included in the final system plan.
Section 744(a)(1) was applicable only if section 744(e) made it so.
Section 744(e) is a complex, poorly drafted statute originally enacted as part of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform
Act of 1976.130 Section 744(e) is comprised of several interrelated
paragraphs. Paragraph one of the statute mandates that Conrail render
service over properties acquired from bankrupt railroads for one-hundred and eighty days following acquisition whether or not such properties are included in the final system plan.'31 Paragraph two dictates the
level of service that Conrail must provide during the mandatory operating period and requires that transportation authorities financially
support commuter rail service during the mandatory operating period
to the same extent the authorities supported it prior to acquisition. Paragraph two also makes the critical reference to section 744(a):
If a . . . [transportation authority] . .

was providing financial

assistance to support the operation of rail passenger service, pursuant
to a lease or agreement which was in effect immediately prior to the
date of [acquisition, Conrail]

. .

. shall be bound by the service pro-

visions of such lease or agreement for the duration of the 180-day
mandatory operation period specified in paragraph (1)of this subsection. If. . . such an authority was providing financial assistance for
the continuation of rail passenger service on rail properties immediately prior to such date of [acquisition], it shall provide the same
level of financial assistance during such 180-day mandatory operation period. If no such financial assistance was being provided or if
no such lease or agreement was in effect immediately prior to such
date of [acquisition], with respect to any such rail properties, [Conrail]

. . . shall

provide the same level of rail passenger service, for the

duration of the such 180-day mandatory operation period, that was
provided prior to such date by the applicable railroad. If(A) such financial assistance is not provided;
(B) a.

.

. [transportation authority] has not, by the end of such

180-day mandatory operation period, offered a rail service continuation payment.

..

;

129. 45 U.S.C. § 718(d)(1) (Supp. 1979).
130. Id. § 801 (1976).
131. Id. § 744(e)(1).
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(C) an applicable rail service continuation payment .. .is not

paid when it is due; or
(D) a payment required under a lease or agreement . ..is not
paid when it is due,
. .may (i) discontinue such railpassenger service, and (ii)
with respect to railproperties not designatedfor inclusion in the final
system plan, abandon such propertiespursuant to subsections (a) and
(b) of this section. 132

[Conrail].

Paragraph four directs that the railway continue to provide the service
after the one-hundred and eighty day period if a transportation authority offers the railway a continuation payment, "except as otherwise provided in this subsection."'' 33 Finally, paragraph five of section 744(e)
directs the Secretary of Transportation to reimburse Conrail for any
otherwise unsubsidized losses it might suffer as 34a result of rendering
service during the mandatory operating period.1
Before it can be determined whether section 744(e) made section
744(a)(1) applicable to Conrail's attempt to discontinue ValparaisoChicago service, the applicability of section 744(e) itself must be established. The language of paragraph two, the only paragraph that explicitly permits Conrail to take any action to discontinue service, did not
apply. It permits Conrail to take action to discontinue service under
four circumstances, not one of which is the expiration of the last applicable subsidy/continuation contract. The policy underlying section
744(e), however, did apply. That policy is that the continuance of unprofitable commuter rail service should be compelled only when a compensating subsidy is available. Paragraph two effectuates that policy by
permitting Conrail to take action to discontinue service when, if it did
otherwise, it would face the prospect of unsubsidized losses.
Paragraphs one and five effectuate that policy by compelling Conrail to
continue service during a mandatory operating period while assuring it
of a subsidy to compensate for any resulting losses. Language and policy appear irreconcilable, but consider paragraph four. Paragraph four
may be interpreted as impliedly permitting Conrail to take action to
discontinue service at the expiration of the last applicable subsidy/continuation contract as "otherwise provided in this subsection"
132.
133.

Id. § 744(e)(2) (emphasis added).
Section 744(e)(4) provides, in pertinent part:

If a . . . (transportation authority) . . .offers a rail service continuation payment ...

for the operation of rail passenger service after the 180-day mandatory operation period,
. . .[Conrail] shall continue to provide such service after the end of such period, except
as otherwise provided in this subsection.
45 U.S.C. § 744(e)(4) (1976).
134. Id. § 744(e)(5).
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and that phrase may be interpreted as referring to paragraph two. 135
Paragraph four may be interpreted, in effect, to add one circumstance
to the list of four in paragraph two. That interpretation would do no
violence to paragraph two while effectuating the underlying policy of
section 744(e). It should, therefore, be adopted. Thus, section 744(e)
apparently was applicable to Conrail's attempt to discontinue Valparaiso-Chicago service.
Whether section 744(e) made section 744(a)(1) applicable then
turns on the meaning of the following key clause in section 744(e):
[Conrail] . . .may (i) discontinue such rail passenger service, and (ii)
with respect to rail properties not designated for inclusion in the final
system plan, abandon such properties pursuant to subsections (a) and
(b) of this section. 136
In that clause, Congress granted Conrail abandonment and discontinuance powers that were to be exercised according to statute. Most elements of that grant of power were not seriously disputed. Conrail
clearly had the power to abandon non-final system plan properties. It
could do so pursuant to section 744(b) which authorized Conrail, upon
proper notice, to abandon properties over which service had been discontinued in accordance with section 744(a). Conrail also had the
power to discontinue any unsubsidized, unprofitable commuter rail
service that it provided during a mandatory operating period. What
was disputed was whether Conrail could exercise that power to discontinue pursuant to section 744(a). The plaintiffs argued that Conrail
could not do so. According to them, Conrail had to proceed under 49
U.S.C. § 10908 which made discontinuance subject to the approval of
the ICC or state regulatory agencies. As the plaintiffs read the clause,
"pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of this section" modified only the
grant of abandonment powers. Conrail, of course, disagreed. As Conrail read the clause, the "pursuant to" phrase modified the grant of
discontinuance as well as abandonment powers. The district court
adopted Conrail's reading of the clause and dismissed the suit. 137 The
Seventh Circuit adopted the plaintiffs' interpretation and reversed.138
135.

The plaintiffs argued that "as otherwise provided in this subsection" referred to para-

graph six which provided "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, [Conrail] is
not obligated to provide rail passenger service on rail properties if a. . . (transportation authority)
contracts for such service to be provided on such properties by an operator other than [Conrail],
except that [Conrail] shall, where appropriate, provide such operator with access to such properties for such purpose." 589 F.2d at 1331, citing 45 U.S.C. § 744(e)(6) (1976).
136. 45 U.S.C. § 744(e)(2) (1976).
137. No. 78 C 3768 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 1978).

138. 589 F.2d at 1334.
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The Seventh Circuit'sApproach
In support of its adoption of the plaintiff's reading of the clause,
the Seventh Circuit contended that that reading was consistent with the
"Rule of the Last Antecedent,"' 139 the reenactment of sections 744(a)
and 744(b),' 40 the final system plan,'41 and the legislative history of the
Railroad Revitalization and Regulation Reform Act of 1976.142 The
"Rule of the Last Antecedent" is rooted not in law but in syntax. If a
prepositional phrase is supposed to modify more than one verb or noun
in a sentence, it is syntactically preferable that the phrase precede all of
them. Such ordering eliminates ambiguity. 14 3 The "rule" is really a
presumption that, in drafting statutes, Congress never fails to use preferred syntax. It teaches that a prepositional phrase which follows
more than one verb (or noun) in a statute modifies only the last. Thus,
the plaintiffs' reading of the key clause was unquestionably consistent
with the "rule." That was no reason, however, for the court to adopt it.
The key clause, considered out of its legislative context, may be read as
it was by the plaintiffs or as it was by Conrail. That ambiguity should
not have been resolved on the basis of a transparently arrogant presumption. Judges are not supposed to be stem schoolmasters who administer grammar lessons to their errant student congressmen.
Moreover, the presumption, as the court admitted,1' was certainly rebuttable. 45 The ambiguity should have been resolved on the basis of
the legislative context of the key clause. To its credit, that is what the
court tried, albeit erringly, to do, except for its flirtation with the "Rule
of Last Antecedent."
One part of the key clause's legislative context was the reenactment, in the Railroad Revitalizaton and Regulatory Reform Act, of
sections 744(a) and 744(b). 146 A reading of the key clause that would
be consistent with that reenactment would have to give full effect to
both the clause and sections 744(a) and 744(b). It would be rather diffi139. Id at 1332. For a discussion of the Rule of Last Antecedent, see United States v. Pritchett, 470 F.2d 455, 459 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
140. 589 F.2d at 1331. See 45 U.S.C. § 744(a), (b) (1976).
141. 589 F.2d at 1331.
142. Id
143. This case, for example, would never have arisen had Congress drafted the key clause as
follows: "Conrail may, pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of this section, (i) discontinue such rail
passenger service and (ii) with respect to rail properties not designated for inclusion in the final
system plan, abandon such properties."
144. 589 F.2d at 1332.
145. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 526-27 (1960).
146. Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Act of Feb. 5, 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-210 § 804, 90 Stat. 31, 133-34.
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cult to give such a reading to the key clause because it is impossible to
give effect to both an amendment and the statutes that the amendment
changed. The key clause was part of an amendment to the statutes then
governing Conrail's discontinuance and abandonment powers and sections 744(a) and 744(b) were those very statutes. The plaintiffs were
unable to do the impossible. Their reading of the key clause, contrary
to the court's contention, was inconsistent with the reenactment. When
Conrail's powers under sections 744(a) and 744(b) are compared with
Conrail's powers under the key clause as the plaintiffs read it, it becomes evident that, at best, the plaintiffs' reading rendered the key
clause mere surplusage, and, at worst, it worked a repeal of section
744(a).
Under section 744(b), Conrail could, upon proper notice, abandon
non-final system plan properties over which service had been discontinued in accordance with section 744(a). 14 7 The key clause, as plaintiffs
read it, permitted Conrail to abandon non-final system plan properties
"pursuant to subsections (a) and (b) of this subsection," and so made
no change in Conrail's abandonment powers.' 48 Under section 744(a),
Conrail could, upon proper notice, discontinue service over non-final
system plan properties. 49 The key clause, as plaintiffs read it, did not
permit Conrail to discontinue service "pursuant to subsections (a) and
(b) of this subsection," and so, the plaintiffs insisted, made no change in
Conrail's discontinuance powers.' 5 0 If what the plaintiffs insisted on
had been correct, then the amendment of which the key clause was a
part would have done no amending; the key clause would have been
mere surplusage. It appears, however, that the plaintiffs were mistaken.
The plaintiffs overlooked the fact that in the key clause there was no
distinction made between discontinuing service over final system plan
and non-final system plan properties. Actually, then, the clause, as the
plaintiffs read it, did not permit Conrail to discontinue any service
whatsoever. In effect, the clause repealed section 744(a).
A second part of the key clause's legislative context was the final
system plan which Congress approved in the Railroad Revitalization
and Regulatory Reform Act. As pertinent, the final service plan provided:
Services Never Covered by Leases or Contracts and Operated Over
Lines to be Acquired by Conrail . . ..
147.
148.
149.
150.

45 U.S.C. § 744(b) (1976).
589 F.2d at 1331. See 45 U.S.C. § 744(e)(2) (1976).
Id. § 744(a).
589 F.2d at 1330-31.
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The services will be continued on the day of conveyance. USRA
recommends that ConRail seek a satisfactory subsidy arrangement
for provisions of these services. If such agreements have not been
executed by the time of conveyance, USRA recommends that ConRail post these services for discontinuance. Approval for such discontinuances must be obtained from the proper regulatory
authorities. 151
The court was obviously correct in contending that the plaintiffs' reading of the key clause was consistent with the final system plan. Since
Congress approved the final system plan, that consistency appeared to
provide strong support for the court's adoption of the plaintiffs' reading. That appearance was deceiving. The final system plan was prepared before the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act
was passed. Unsurprisingly, it accurately reflected the law that controlled at the time of its preparation. 52 The act, however, significantly
amended the prior law. It is unlikely that Congress has ever intended
that amendments be interpreted in conformity with the statutes the
amendment changed. It is thus unlikely, despite Congress' approval of
the final system plan, that Congress wanted the act interpreted in conformity with the prior law or the final system plan which accurately
reflected it.
Moreover, Congress' approval of the final system plan was based
on a projection of Conrail's profitability which was, in turn, based on
the assumption that Conrail would obtain full compensation for its passenger service. 53 That assumption would be undermined if Conrail
could not summarily discontinue all unsubsidized, unprofitable commuter rail service. Yet, as the plaintiffs read the key clause, Conrail
could not. It would be perverse indeed to use the approval of the final
system plan to support a reading which would undermine the assumption upon which that approval was based.
A third part of the key clause's legislative context was the legislative history of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act.
According to the Seventh Circuit, that history showed that the "motivation for the. . . Act was to provide for the continuation of certain rail
passenger lines. . . .,1'4 Continuation would, of course, be promoted
by a restrictive reading of those clauses in the act which grant discontinuance and abandonment powers to private railroads like Conrail.
151. ld at 1333.
152. The applicable law prior to the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act was
the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, 45 U.S.C. § 701 (1976).
153. S. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 14, 45; H.R. REP. No. 725, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 86.
154. 589 F.2d at 1331.
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The plaintiffs' reading of the key clause was certainly more restrictive
than Conrail's. Thus, it was logical for the court to conclude that the
plaintiffs' reading was consistent with the legislative history of the act.
The court's logic was unassailable, but its premise was completely
off-base. The legislative history of the act shows that Congress wished
to lessen the burden on railroads, in general, and Conrail, in particular,
of providing unsubsidized, unprofitable service. Congress' wish is evidenced in the Senate conference report that accompanied the bill that
eventually became the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform
Act. 155 The Senate conference report states:
The bill makes clear the obligation of ConRail and other carriers, as
determined by the ICC, to provide rail service on lines where an
assistance payment is offered .... The bill provides that ConRail
must continue service being provided on the date of [acquisition] for
180 days during which time it will be reimbursed for any losses incurred for the provision of that service . .

ConRail is obligated to

continue to provide such service after the initial 180 day period if the
appropriate56 State or commuter authority offers a service assistance
payment.'
The unmistakable import of the Senate conference report is that Congress wished that Conrail be permitted to discontinue all unsubsidized,
unprofitable commuter rail service. The motivation for the Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act, then, was clearly not "to
157
provide for the continuation of certain rail passenger lines."'
Had the Seventh Circuit given proper consideration to the reenactment of sections 744(a) and 744(b), the final system plan and the legislative history of the act, it would not have resolved the ambiguity in the
key clause in the manner urged by the plaintiffs. Had the court given
any consideration to the most important part of the key clause's legislative context, the economic function of the act, it surely would have resolved the ambiguity in the manner urged by Conrail. The Railroad
Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act seems well designed to promote efficiency in railroad operations. With respect to ratemaking, for
example, it establishes the variable cost of a service as the presumptive
155. S. CONF. REP. No. 595, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 131, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 148.
156. S. CONF. REP. No. 595, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 143-44, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 158.
157. Had the court considered the historical trend in the abandonment and discontinuance
powers permitted railroads under the applicable statutes, it might have given the legislative history
of the 4-R Act more careful scrutiny. The trend has been in the direction of expansion. Compare
Act of Feb. 28, 1920, ch. 91, § 402, 41 Stat. 477 and Act of Aug. 12, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-625, § 5,
72 Stat. 571 with Act of Jan. 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-236 § 304, 87 Stat. 1008.
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rate floor;' 58 permits competition in the transportation market, where
there is any, to set the rate ceiling; 5 9 and encourages peak-load pricing.' 60 With respect to the discontinuance and abandonment of unprofitable intercity passenger service and properties, the act grants far
more decision-making leeway to managment than did the statutes it
superceded. 161 Plaintiffs' reading of the key clause was at odds with the
economic function of the act. 162 Under that reading, Conrail could be
compelled to provide commuter rail service for which passengers and
local governments were unwilling to pay the costs 16 3 and to cross-subsidize that service with revenues derived from its freight shippers. Such
a result would be very inefficient. Conrail's reading of the key clause
was in harmony with the economic function of the act and thus the
Seventh Circuit should have adopted it.
ENTRY INTO TRUCKING MARKETS

Entry into most markets is relatively unrestricted. Generally, any
entrepreneur who wishes to compete is free to do so. It is that freedom
that poses a constant threat to the financial well-being of established
firms. These firms stand to lose a portion of their income to new entrants if they should fail to produce what their customers demand or if
they should charge prices in excess of the long-run marginal production
costs that a well-managed firm using the best available technology
158. 49 U.S.C. § 10701(2)(A) (1979).
159. Id § 10709.
160. Id § 10727.
161. Id. §§ 10903-10905. Compare Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 § la; added Feb.
5, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 802, 809(c), 90 Stat. 127-30, 146.
162. Plaintiffs' reading was also at odds with the Rail Service Continuation Assistance program of section 805 of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act which was
designed to encourage the making of subsidy/continuation contracts by providing federal funds to
those local governments making them. 45 U.S.C. § 805 (1976). Under plaintiffs' reading, Conrail
would be permitted to summarily discontinue service if no subsidy/continuation contract were
made, but would not be permitted to do the same if a contract were made but not renewed or
replaced. That anomaly would create powerful disincentives to the making of subsidy/continuation contracts.
163. The court may have thought that under the key clause, as read by the plaintiffs, Conrail
could not be so compelled. That seems to be the implication of (1) its observation that, despite its
adoption of the plaintiffs' reading, Conrail would still be able to take action to discontinue commuter rail service expeditiously pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 10908 (1979), 589 F.2d at 1334; and (2) its
suggestion that under 49 U.S.C. § 10908, the ICC might be obligated to permit Conrail to discontinue any unsubsidized, unprofitable commuter rail service. 589 F.2d at 1332. If that is what the
court thought, it was patently mistaken. If Conrail must proceed under 49 U.S.C. § 10908, it will,
in all likelihood, be compelled to provide unsubsidized, unprofitable commuter rail service while
it litigates its proposed discontinuances before the ICC and the United States courts of appeals;
and it will have no assurance of prevailing in that litigation. In adopting the plaintiffs' reading of
the key clause, the court was not merely relegating Conrail to alternative procedures but rather to
the regulations and mercy of the ICC under which its corporate predecessors went bankrupt.
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would incur. Of course, that threat tends to induce improvements in
the variety of goods and services produced and also tends to check
prices. It puts pressure on complacent or inept managers to respond to
developments in their markets. It reduces the chances of successful economic collusion of the tacit or even overt variety. Hence, what is a
threat to established firms is a boon to the consuming public. In our
economy, in short, unrestricted entry is one of the principal spurs to
efficiency in production and pricing, and, thus, to optimal allocation of
our scarce productive resources.
Nevertheless, entry into some markets is restricted. Entry into
most interstate trucking markets is restricted by the Motor Carrier Act
of 1935,164 a statute that reflects the protectionist mentality of the Great
Depression. 6 5 Generally, under that statute, an entrepreneur who
66
wishes to offer interstate trucking services must apply for a certificate'
or permit' 67 from the ICC. The applicant can obtain one only by persuading the ICC that he is "fit, willing, and able" to provide the serv168 and that those services are "required by"'1 6 9 or
ices he wishes to offer
"consistent with"' 170 the "present or future public convenience and necessity." 1 7 1 The ICC, of course, need not approve the application and,
if it does not, the entrepreneur may not compete. It is thus clear that
the ICC may, under the Motor Carrier Act of 1935,l72 compromise the
efficiency that would be spurred by new entry; it may do so in order to
protect the income of established firms from competitive erosion.
The statute authorizes the ICC, in passing on applications for certificates or permits, to compromise but not to utterly disregard the efficiency that would be spurred by new entry. If the ICC disregarded that
efficiency, entry into interstate trucking markets would be foreclosed,
not merely restricted, and the consuming public would be deprived of a
great boon. It does not appear that that is the economic function of the
Motor Carrier Act of 1935. Moreover, foreclosing entry would be inconsistent with the decisions of the United States Supreme Court holding that established trucking firms have no right to be free from the
164. Act of Aug. 9, 1935, ch. 498, § 201, 49 Stat. 543. Certain markets not here relevant do not
come within the act's reach.
165. See Jones, Antitrust & Specific Economic Regulation. An Introduction to Comparative
Analysis, 19 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION 261, 279-99 (1961).
166. 49 U.S.C. § 10922 (1979) (common carriers must have a certificate).
167. Id § 10923 (contract carriers must have a permit).
168. Id §§ 10922-10923.
169. Id § 10922.
170. Id § 10923.
171. Id §§ 10922-10923.
172. 49 U.S.C. § 305 (1976).
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threat of new competition. 173 In addition, such action would be inconsistent with the National Transportation Policy 174 which requires that
trucking be regulated so as to "promote. . .adequate, economical, and
efficient transportation."'' 75 Yet, the ICC utterly disregarded the efficiency that would be spurred by new entry when it denied the application of Niedert Motor Carrier, Inc., for a certificate to transport general
commodities 76 between Chicago and two Indiana counties in the Chicago commerical district.' 77 In Niedert Motor Service, Inc. v. United
States,' 78 the Seventh Circuit reversed the denial and remanded the
application, but the court failed to clearly articulate the efficiency rationale underlying its decision. The court's failure to do so may invite
the ICC to repeat its error, much to the detriment of those who ship by
truck and all of us who purchase goods that are so shipped.
Niedert Motor Service, Inc. v. United States
Niedert Motor Service, Inc. 179 has been an intrastate motor carrier
since 1925. Its principal area of operation has been that portion of Illinois within fifty miles of its terminal in Des Plaines, Illinois, a Chicago
suburb.' 80 Niedert has been authorized by the Illinois Commerce
Commission to transport general commodities' 8' to all points in its
principal area of operation and, when serving shippers located in that
area, to all points in Illinois. 82 Niedert has also been permitted to
serve other points, including those out of state, by interlining with suit173. See Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 298 (1974);
United States v. Dixie Highway Express, Inc., 389 U.S. 409, 411 (1967).
174. 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (1979) (originally enacted as Act of Sept. 18, 1940, ch. 722 § 1,54 Stat.
899).
175. 49 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2) (1979).
176. Niedert wished to carry "general commodities, except classes A and B explosives, household goods as defined by the Commission, commodities in bulk, and those requiring special
equipment." Niedert Motor Serv., Inc., 125 M.C.C. 209, 210 (1976).
177. Id The two counties were Lake County and Porter County, both located in northwestern
Indiana.
178. 583 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1978).
179. Hereinafter referred to as Niedert.
180. The terminal covered 24,000 square feet. 583 F.2d at 956. It had dock space for one
hundred trailers. Id at 960.
181. Niedert was authorized to transport what the Illinois Commerce Commission called general freight and household goods. Id at 956. Apparently, there was no real difference between
those items and the items that Niedert wished to transport to the two Indiana counties. In any
event, Niedert did not apply for authority to transport items interstate that it was not already
transporting intrastate.
182. According to the court, Niedert had been authorized to transport "[gleneralfreight and
household goods within a fifty-mile (50) radius of 1300 Oakwood Avenue, Des Plaines, Illinois,
and to transport such property to or from any point outside of such authorized area of operation
for a shipper or shippers within such area." 583 F.2d at 956.
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able carriers. 183
For many years, Niedert served two Indiana counties in the Chicago commercial district by interlining with other carriers. By the beginning of 1973, however, it could no longer continue to do so. Niedert
found itself unable to negotiate an interlining agreement under which it
could recoup its costs. 184 Therefore, Niedert applied to the ICC for a
85
certificate to replace the interlined with its own direct service.
During the administrative hearing at which Niedert's application
was considered, 86 Niedert showed that the operations at its terminal, a
vital element in the service it wished to offer, were extraordinarily efficient. 187 At its terminal, Niedert would typically receive from a shipper
a number of packages bound for various places, segregate them according to where they were bound, consolidate them with packages received
from other shippers bound for the same place, and then deliver them to
their destinations or the appropriate interlining carriers. Niedert would
do all this in no more than twenty-four hours and it would do so for
about one million pounds of freight every working day. On the basis of
this evidence, Niedert argued that the service it wished to offer was
"required by the present or future public convenience and necessity."
The ICC was not persuaded. It dismissed Niedert's evidence as irrelevant on the ground that Niedert's terminal operations were not transportation services. 88 Since Niedert had thus failed to meet its burden
of persuasion, the ICC denied its application for a certificate. 189 Reversing and remanding, the Seventh Circuit held that the ICC had
made three errors in arriving at its decision.190 Analysis reveals, how183. See 49 U.S.C. § 10931 (1979). Interlining is the sequential handling of a given shipment
by two or more carriers.
184. That was the finding of the administrative law judge and the ICC adopted it. 125 M.C.C
at 211, 212.
185. 583 F.2d at 957. See 49 U.S.C. § 10928 (1979).
186. The application was originally assigned to an employee of the Illinois Commerce Commission. Evidence was presented to him but he resigned before rendering a decision. An administrative law judge then reviewed the record and issued his decision. 583 F.2d at 957.
187. The fact that the operations at Niedert's terminal were extraordinarily efficient was indisputed. Even the ICC admitted, "it is conceded that certain aspects of applicant's service . . .
cannot be matched by existing carriers.
...125 M.C.C. at 218.
188. Id.
189. It could be argued that the ICC denied Niedert's application simply because it found
existing service adequate. The ICC did state, "we find that there is no public need for extension of
applicant's service from the Chicago area into Lake and Porter Counties which cannot be met as
well by existing carriers." Id. at 219. If that is what the ICC did then it was clearly in error.
Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1957); P.C. White Truck Line, Inc. v.
ICC, 551 F.2d 1326, 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Trans-American Van Serv., Inc. v. United States, 421
F. Supp. 308, 320-21 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Nashua Motor Express, Inc. v. United States, 230 F. Supp.
646, 653 (D.N.H. 1964).
190. 583 F.2d at 959-63.
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ever, that those errors were really one and the same.
The Seventh Circuit'sApproach
The first error of which the court complained was the ICC's dismissal of Niedert's evidence on the ground that Niedert's terminal operations were not transportation services. According to the court, that
constituted an unexplained and unlawful departure from the principle
underlying past ICC cases. 19 1 The court found four ICC cases, in
which the ICC passed on applications for new operating authority, particularly instructive. 92 In each of the cases, the ICC explicitly classified particular services as transportational or non-transportational.
In Kenosha Auto Transport Corp., 19 3 the ICC denied an application, classifying as non-transportational the storing of imported cars at
the Port of Baltimore while they awaited shipment inland at unspecified future dates. 194 The ICC approved an application in Grin Mobile
Home Transporting Co. ,195 classifying as transportational the services
required to make mobile home trailers usable after delivery to their
owners. 196 The services proposed by Griffin included repairing minor
damage, connecting utilities, and assembling "expando" models.' 97 In
WS. Hatch Co.,98 the ICC approved an application, classifying as
transportational the spreading of asphalt sealer with the truck in which
the sealer was hauled.' 99 Finally, in Tennessee Transport, Inc.,2 °° the
ICC granted an application, classifying as transportational, services required to ready houseboats for cruising. 20 1 The services included
remounting flying bridges, catwalks, radio antennae and other items
dismounted for transit, launching and test driving the boats, and instructing customers in the handling of the boats. 20 2 The Seventh Circuit declared that Niedert's terminal operations were much more
191. Id at 960.
192. Tennessee Transp., Inc., 124 M.C.C. 811 (1976); W.S. Hatch Co., 108 M.C.C. 853 (1969);
Griffin Mobile Home Transp. Co., 103 M.C.C. 482 (1966), af'd sub nom., National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. United States, 394 U.S. 849 (1969); Kenosha Auto Transp. Corp., 83 M.C.C. 527
(1960).
193. 83 M.C.C. 527 (1960).
194. Id at 536-37.
195. 103 M.C.C. 482 (1966), aIrd sub nom., National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. United States,
394 U.S. 849 (1969).
196. 103 M.C.C. at 500-01.
197. Id at 491.
198. 108 M.C.C. 853 (1969).
199. Id. at 860-61.
200. 124 M.C.C. 811 (1976).
201. Id at 815.
202. Id at 814.
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analogous to the services proposed in Grfiln, Hatch, and Tennessee
than to the services proposed in Kenosha. The court buttressed its declaration with a fifth ICC decision, Jerry Lopps, Inc. ,203 in which the ICC
denied an application because, inter alia, the applicant did not own
terminal facilities needed to provide effective service. 2°4 The Seventh
Circuit, however, did not elucidate the principle underlying these ICC
decisions or apply it to Niedert's terminal operations.
It is not difficult to deduce the principle underlying the ICC decisions, although the ICC did not articulate one. In the four ICC cases
the Seventh Circuit found most instructive, the applicants all wished to
offer one or more services in addition to basic transportation. Presumably, the applicants wished to do so because their potential customers
had an unfulfilled need for both. It was clear that some of those additional services could be performed most efficiently by whichever carrier
provided the customers with basic transportation. 20 5 For example, in
WS. Hatch Co., there could have been little doubt that spreading
asphalt sealerwith the truck in which it was transported would be more
efficient than transferring the sealer to another truck and spreading it
with that one. 20 6 The ICC apparently perceived that it was obligated to
consider such additional services in passing on each application and so
it classified them as transportational. 207 This is the principle underlying these ICC cases and so the ICC's approach was correct. Had the
ICC failed to consider these additional services, classifying them as
non-transportational, it would have unlawfully disregarded the efficiency that a new entrant might introduce with its own operations and
induce in that of its competitors' operations. Unfortunately, that is pre203. 105 M.C.C. 811 (1967).
204. Id at 819-21.
205. In Griffin Mobile Home Transp. Co., the ICC observed that it was "not economically
practicable for someone other than the carrier to render these special services apart from the linehaul transportation." 103 M.C.C. at 499. The ICC also observed that assembling the "expando"
models was:
necessary to the effectuation of the matter in chief, ..
because otherwise the supporting
shippers are required to send one of their own employees to the delivery site to provide
such service before acceptance is given by the consignee. In such event, the house trailers would simply not be tendered to a f6r-hire carrier because of the prohibitive cost.
Id at 500. In Tennessee Transp. Inc., the ICC found that "[it would be economically unfeasible
for shippers to consign boats to protestants for transport and also send an employee to the delivery
site to perform the setup services." 124 M.C.C. at 814. Kenosha Auto Transport Corp., the only
one of the four cases in which the ICC classified a service as non-transportational, is not inconsistent with the other three. It seems rather unlikely that Kenosha, the transporting firm, could have
performed the service of storing autos indefinitely more efficiently than any other firm.
206. In W.S. Hatch Co., the ICC noted that "lilt is clear on this record that spreading the
sealer on the surface is the most feasible means of accomplishing the delivery of this commodity."
108 M.C.C. at 861.
207. Id at 861-62.
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cisely what the ICC did when it denied Niedert's application for a certificate. Thus, in dismissing Niedert's evidence as irrelevant on the
ground that Niedert's terminal operations were non-transportational,
the ICC not only departed, without explanation, from the principle underlying past ICC cases, but more importantly, shirked its duty to consider the efficiency which would have been spurred by Niedert's entry
into the market.
The second error of which the court complained was the ICC's
failure to consider the inherent advantages of the service which Niedert
wished to offer.20 8 The court found that this violated the teaching of
the United States Supreme Court in Schaffer Transportation Co. v.
United States.20 9 The genesis of Schaffer was a request for operating
authority to provide motor carrier service in competition with a railroad. The ICC refused the request. In so doing, the ICC failed to consider the inherent advantages of truck over train transportation. The
United States Supreme Court held that such a failure contravened the
section of the National Transportation Policy which requires the ICC
to regulate the various modes of transportation subject to its jurisdiction so as to promote the inherent advantages of each. 210 That section
is inapplicable to requests, like Niedert's, for operating authority to
provide motor carrier service in competition with other motor carriers. 2 11 But the teaching of Schaffer is applicable. 21 2 The inherent advantages of one mode of transportation over another must be the
ability of a carrier utilizing that mode to incur less costs in the perform21 3 It
ance of a particular service than a carrier utilizing the other mode.
is precisely that sort of ability that would enable a new entrant to offer
more efficient service and force its competitors to do the same. In essence, the United States Supreme Court took the ICC to task in Schafer for failing to consider that efficiency. Thus, the teaching of Schaffer
is that the ICC must, in passing on requests for operating authority,
consider the efficiency which would be spurred by new entry. In refusing Niedert's request, the ICC certainly violated that teaching, thereby
208. 583 F.2d at 962.
209. 355 U.S. 83 (1957).
210. Id at 89. See 49 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(1) (1979).
211. See id See also 583 F.2d at 962.
212. See Trans-American Van Serv., Inc. v. United States, 421 F. Supp. 308, 326 (N.D. Tex.
1976); Vincent Montone Transp., Inc. v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 484, 488 (M.D. Pa. 1964).
213. See KAHN, supra note 31, at 160-66. Admittedly, the court in Schaffer held that in passing on applications to provide service, the ICC was obligated to compare only the "inherent advantages" of different transportation modes, not the advantages of different transportation firms.
It could be argued then that the decision does not teach that the ICC must consider the relative
efficiencies of firms employing the same mode.
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committing the same error that it made when it dismissed Niedert's
evidence as irrelevant.
The third, and final, error of which the court complained was the
ICC's failure to consider the benefits of increased competition. 21 4 The
district court found this to be in direct violation of the Seventh Circuit's
own decision in Sawyer Transport, Inc. v. United States.2 1 5 It is difficult
to know what those benefits could be other than the efficiency that
would be spurred by new entry. It appears then that in failing to consider those benefits, the ICC committed the same error it committed in
failing to consider inherent advantages and in dismissing Niedert's evidence as irrelevant.
The Seventh Circuit in Niedert Motor Service failed to clearly explain its decision in terms of the economic function of the controlling
statutes. As a result, the court held that the ICC had made three errors
when it had made only one. It could be argued, of course, that that
holding will insure three times over that the ICC, in passing on future
applications for certificates or permits, will always consider the efficiencies that might be spurred by new entry. I think not. The Seventh
Circuit's holding focuses concern on metaphysical questions such as:
What is "transportation"? What advantages are "inherent"? How can
the benefits of would-be competition be demonstrated? The ICC may,
given its protectionist bent, develop answers to those questions which
will lead it to make the same error that it made in this case. Repetition
of the error could only be harmful to the consuming public. The
court's decision, then, may be questioned not only on jurisprudential
grounds but on quite practical ones as well.
CONTROLLING THE REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES

NaturalGas Pipeline Co. v. FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission
21 6
In mid-1974, Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America
loaned $6.7 million, interest-free, to two firms engaged in the business
of producing natural gas. The funds were earmarked for exploratory
drilling and well development on particular leaseholds, and they were
so expended over the course of about two years. In return for the loans,
214. 583 F.2d at 963.
215. 565 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1977). In Sawyer Transport, the court relied heavily on Bowman
Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281 (1974), and particularly, P.C. White
Truck Line, Inc. v. ICC, 551 F.2d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
216. Hereinafter referred to as Natural.
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Natural obtained only the right to purchase any gas that the firms
might produce from those leaseholds. Although the loans were interest-free, they were hardly eleemosynary. Natural's management expected that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 2 17 pursuant to
the advance payment program, 2 18 would permit it to raise its rates in
order to recoup from its customers at least the costs of financing the
loans. Accordingly, Natural filed a request with the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission 21 9 for permission to raise its rates effective
September 1, 1974.
The advanced payment program was one of several FERC initiatives calculated to ameliorate the natural gas "shortage, '220 the disequilibrium in supply and demand that the FERC caused in the first
place by holding the wellhead rates for natural gas below market clearing levels. 22' The program was based on the theory that the supply of
natural gas would likely increase if producers could obtain lower cost
exploration and development capital. 222 It was designed to put an incentive created by traditional rate regulation to use in inducing pipelines to provide that captial.
Traditionally, a regulatory authority attempts to set rates so as to
217. Pursuant to the provisions of the Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No.
95-91, 91 Stat. 565, 42 U.S.C. § 7101 (Aug. 4, 1977), and Executive Order No. 12,009, 42 Fed. Reg.
46,267 (Sept. 13, 1977), the Federal Power Commission ceased to exist on September 30, 1977, and
most of its functions and regulatory responsibilities were transferred to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which, along with the Department of Energy, was activated on October 1,
1977.
218. At the time that Natural made its loans, the advanced payment program was embodied in
a series of ICC orders: Order No. 410, 44 F.P.C. 1142 (1970); Order No. 410-A, 45 F.P.C. 135
(1971); Order No. 441, 46 F.P.C. 1178 (1971); Order No. 465, 48 F.P.C. 1550 (1972); Order No.
499, 50 F.P.C. 2111 (1973). The program was terminated in Order of December 31, 1975 (Dckt.
Nos. R-411 and RM74-4), issued on remand of Order No. 499 from United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. See Public Serv. Comm'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 511 F.2d
338-(D.C. Cir. 1975). Nevertheless, advanced payment contracts entered into prior to termination
retain their vitality and continued administration of the program will be required as pipeline
companies file requests with the FERC for appropriate rate increases.
219. Hereinafter referred to as FERC.
220. See, e.g., Order No. 428, 45 F.P.C. 454 (1971) (exempting from direct rate regulation
independent producers of natural gas with annual jurisdictional sales of less than 10,000,000 Mcf
at 14.65 psia) and Order No. 491, 50 F.P.C. 742 (1973) (exempting from certification requirements
and direct rate regulation intrastate producers of natural gas making sales during a 180-day period
to pipelines experiencing or expecting curtailment). Order No. 428 was set aside by the United
States Supreme Court in Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U S.380 (1974) and Order
No. 491 was set aside by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Consumer Fed. of America v. Federal Power Comm'n, 515 F.2d 347 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
221.

See M. LEE, STATE/FEDERAL REGULATION OF NATURAL GAS (originally printed by the

State of Texas Governor's Energy Advisory Council, October 29, 1974; available at the Southern
Illinois University Law School library); Breyer & MacAvoy, The Natural Gas Shortage and the
Regulation ofNatural Gas Producers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 9 (1973); MacAvoy, The Regulation-Induced Shortage ofNaturalGas, 14 J. LAW & ECON. 167 (1971).
222. See Public Serv. Comm'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 511 F.2d 338, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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limit the revenue of a public utility company to that which the company will require to meet necessary operating expenses and earn a reasonable return on some dollar measure of its "rate base. ' 223 The rate
base usually consists of the capital prudently invested in the physical
224
assets used by the company to provide service during a "test year.
twelve-month period for
The test year is typically the most recent 225
available.
is
data
which complete operating
A public utility company subject to traditional rate regulation will
have a strong incentive to inflate its rate base if it will increase its net
revenues by doing so. A public utility is likely to do just that if it possesses unexploited monopoly pricing power and is permitted to earn a
rate of return in excess of its marginal cost of capital. 226 A company
with an incentive to inflate its rate base will tend to invest capital in
physical assets that add to or replace the producing capacity of existing
assets, but that need not be so. It would invest capital in any item that
its regulatory authority would consider in determining its rate base.
The FERC declared, in the orders constituting its advanced payment program, that it would consider loans like Natural's in determining a pipeline company's rate base if the funds involved were
appropriately expended within a "reasonable time" after the company
disbursed them. 22 7 Under this program, a pipeline company with an
incentive to inflate its rate base could do so by loaning exploration and
development capital to natural gas producers. This is exactly what the
FERC wanted pipeline companies to do 228 and the companies com229
plied with the FERC program.
223. Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 289
(1922) (separate opinion of Brandeis, J.). See generaly KAHN, supra note 31, at 25-54.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint,52 AMER. ECON.
REV. 1052 (1962); Wellisz, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipeline Companies: An Economic Analysis,
71 J. POL. ECON. 30 (1963).
Both conditions must prevail. If the company had exploited all of its monopoly pricing
power, it already would have maximized its net revenues. Since it could not increase them by
inflating its rate base, it would have no incentive to try and do so. If the company were limited to
a rate of return less than its marginal cost of capital, it would tend to lose more than it would gain
by disbursing capital. Since it would stand to decrease its net revenues by inflating its rate base, it
would have no incentive to try and do so.
The tendency of public utility companies subject to traditional rate regulation to inflate their
rate bases is called the "A-J-W effect." It would appear to be widespread. See 2 A. KAHN, THE
EcONOMICS OF REGULATION 49-59 (1971).
227. Order No. 499, 50 F.P.C. 2111, 2115 (1973).

228. Public Serv. Comm'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 467 F.2d 361, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
229. A report prepared on the basis of data collected by the ICC showed a total of $5.5 billion
had been committed to similar loans as of February 1, 1976. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1094, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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It would appear, then, that Natural's management was not patently unreasonable in expecting the FERC to permit Natural to raise
its rates in order to recoup 230 at least the costs of financing its loans.

Yet, the FERC frustrated those expectations. 23' The FERC decided to
exclude from Natural's rate base all but about $1 million of the loaned
funds and, accordingly, deny, in part, Natural's request for higher
rates. 232 The FERC reached its decision on the ground that the other
$5.7 million, having been expended more than thirty days after the end
of the test year, had not been expended within a "reasonable time"
233
after Natural disbursed the funds.

The Seventh Circuit'sApproach
In Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission,2 34 the Seventh Circuit reversed the FERC's decision. 235 The court held that, in reaching the decision, the FERC had
indulged in the unlawful practice of retroactive rate-making.2 36 That
holding could not be questioned if the FERC had 1) found that Natural's old rates, although previously approved, were too high, 2) ordered
that lower rates be substituted for the old ones, and 3) required that
Natural refund to its customers the difference between the old and the
237
new rates. Such action by the FERC would have been quite illegal
230. If Natural were permitted to earn a rate of return in excess of its marginal cost of capital,
it could expect to not only recoup the costs of financing the loans, but to turn a profit as well.
231. See Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 590
F.2d 664, 665 (7th Cir. 1979).
232. Natural's request for higher rates was based only in part on the loans it had made to the
producers. Issues unrelated to the loans were disposed of in a settlement agreement.
233. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, FPC Docket No. RP73-1 10 (June 3, 1977) (unpublished order of Federal Power Commission modifying initial decision).
234. 590 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1979).
235. Id at 670.
236. In its opinion, the court also faulted the ICC for failing to give pipelines like Natural
sufficient guidelines for making loans to producers. Id at 669-70. It is not entirely clear whether
the court took the view that this alleged failure supported its holding or constituted an independent ground for reversing the ICC decision. If the court was of the latter view, it was clearly
mistaken. It is perfectly permissible for the ICC to subject pipeline companies to the risk that
expenditures they choose to make may later be determined unjust and unreasonable. Federal
Power Comm'n v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 391-92 (1974). But see Consumer Fed'n of America
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 515 F.2d 347, 359 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit subsequently stated, "we did not intend Consumers
Federation to express a general solicitude for all pipelines caught in a 'squeeze' to obtain gas."
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1094, 1116 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
237. Cf. Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1932)
(the Court held that the ICC had acted illegally when it took similar action against a railroad
company).
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and not at all authorized by the governing statute. 23 8 In addition, such
action would have been very unfair to Natural 239 and contrary to the
immediate goal of rate regulation, would have made the pipeline business so risky that the cost of capital might have boosted rates to monopolistic levels. The FERC, however, did not, in fact, engage in any such
action. Rather, the FERC merely excluded an item from Natural's rate
base and did so in the process of setting, prospectively, 240 Natural's just
and reasonable rates. Apparently, the court objected to the exclusion
as retroactive rate-making because it was based on a rule, the "thirtyday rule," that had not been announced in any of the orders that then
24
constituted the advanced payment program. '
The Seventh Circuit's objection was not well-taken. The choice of
whether to act in an adjudicatory proceeding on the basis of a rule
previously promulgated in an informal rulemaking was well within the
FERC's discretion. 242 It does not appear that the FERC abused this
discretion. Indeed, it could be argued that the FERC made its choice
judiciously. Consider three factors. First, the "thirty-day rule" represented a refinement of, not a departure from, the "reasonable time"
proviso contained in the advanced payment program orders. 243 Second, it is not at all clear that Natural's management, in making the
loans, reasonably relied on the non-existence of the rule. 244 Natural's
238. 42 U.S.C. §§ 717(c), 717(d) (1976).
239. C. NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1966). Majestic negotiated
with a union before a majority of its employees had affiliated themselves. The Board, overruling
an earlier decision of longstanding, found that Majestic had provided "unlawful assistance to a
union" in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976). The court overturned the Board's decision
and noted, in dictum:
Although courts have not generally balked at allowing administrative agencies to apply a
rule newly fashioned in an adjudicative proceeding to past conduct, a decision branding
as "unfair" conduct stamped "fair" at the time a party acted, raises judicial hackles considerably more than a determination that merely brings within the agency's jurisdiction
or shortens the period in which a collective
an employer previously left without, ...
or imposes a more severe remedy for
bargaining agreement may bar a new election, ..
conduct already prohibited ....
355 F.2d at 860.
240. Although the ICC's decision was rendered in 1977, long after the period for which the
higher rates requested by Natural would have been effective, it was rendered from a prospective
view. Natural's management clearly understood that the rates it was permitted to charge in the
interim were subject to refund. 590 F.2d at 665.
241. Id. at 669-70.
242. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974).
243. The degree of "retroactivity" is an important consideration in determining whether a
regulatory authority has abused its discretion by acting in an adjudicatory proceeding on the basis
of a rule not previously promulgated in an informal rulemaking. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194, 203 (1947); NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854, 861 (2d Cir. 1966).
244. Unless Natural's management, in making the loans, reasonably relied on the non-existence of the rule, there could be little, if any, justification for denying the ICC the administrative
flexibility it apparently perceived that it needed in handling the timing problem. See Order Denying Rehearing of Order No. 499, 51 F.P.C. 818, 819 (1974).
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management knew or should have known that fundamental regulatory
principles would, in any event, require that it justify the inclusion of
the loans in its rate base. 245 Third, the hardship that the application of
the rule caused Natural was not as great as it might appear. 246 The
exclusion really amounted to a mere deferral rather than an outright
247
ban on rate base treatment.
Whenever a regulatory authority engaged in traditional rate regulation excludes an item from a public utility company's rate base, it
acts, in a sense, retroactively. 248 The regulatory authority refuses to
take into consideration one or more of the company's past expenditures
for the purpose of calculating required revenues. But a regulatory authority must be able to do just that if it is to exercise any meaningful
control over the company's revenues and expenditures. 249 The regulatory authority must exercise that control if it is to have any chance of
doing its basic job which is to obtain from the company an economic
performance superior to that expected from an unregulated monopolist. In Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. FederalEnergy Regulatory Commission,250 the Seventh Circuit limited the ability of
regulatory authorities to exclude items from rate bases, control revenues and expenditures-in short, to do their jobs-and the court did so
unnecessarily.
The court could have reached the same result without holding that
the FERC had indulged in retroactive rate-making. To do so, the court
would have had to undertake an economic analysis of the advanced
payment program. When a pipeline company agrees to make interestfree loans, as did Natural, it, in effect, agrees to pay a higher price for
the gas it expects to purchase from the recipient producers. By agreeing
to pay a higher price, the pipeline company will likely call forth a

245. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Texaco, Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 391 (1974); Tennessee Gas
Pipeline Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1094, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
KAHN, supra note 31, at 26-35.
246. The extent of the hardship caused is also an important consideration in determining
whether a regulatory authority has abused its discretion by acting in an adjudicatory proceeding
on the basis of a rule not previously promulgated in an informal rulemaking. NLRB v. Bell
Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974).
247. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1094,
1108 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Eventually, as the funds were expended, the excluded portion of the loans
would be included in the rate base.
248. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 7 Cal. 3d. 331, 497 P.2d 785, 102
Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972); New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 275 N.E.2d 493
(Mass. 1971).
249. KAHN, supra note 3 1, at 26-35.
250. 590 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1979).
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greater supply of gas 25 1 while, at the same time, practically requiring a
boost in its own rates. The "thirty-day rule" did not meaningfully distinguish between those loans that probably would call forth a greater
supply of gas without boosting pipeline rates unreasonably and those
loans that probably would not do so.252 The "thirty-day rule" bore no
clear relation to the economic function of the advanced payment program, and so, any decision based on it would have been arbitrary and
capricious. 253 The Seventh Circuit in NaturalPipeline Co. should have
so held.
CONCLUSION

Analyzing statutes and rules in terms of their economic function
can be, as any reader of this article could attest, painfully intricate,
intellectually exhausting legal work. Nevertheless, courts must bear the
responsibility of doing that work as long as legislatures and administrative agencies persist in using law to control major business decisions.
Otherwise, policies with important economic ramifications may be rendered nugatory and the shibboleths of administrative law may be
found to be meaningless. Unfortunately, in the four major regulatory
cases the court decided during the 1978-79 term, the Seventh Circuit
did not quite meet its responsibility.

251. Higher prices would not call forth a greater supply of gas only under conditions of complete inelasticity of supply. It would appear that such conditions do not prevail in the natural gas
market. STAFF OF SENATE INTERIOR & INSULAR AFFAIRS COMM., 93RD CONG., 1St SESS., NATURAL GAS POLICY ISSUES AND OPTIONS, (Comm. Print 1973) 32-33; REGULATION OF THE NATURAL GAS PRODUCING INDUSTRY 3-5 (1972).

252. The "thirty-day rule" was based on the ICC observation that producers were normally
permitted thirty days from the date of billing to pay for contract work and materials. Tennessee
Gas Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1094, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
The ICC never explained what relationship conventional credit-sale terms bore to the economic

function of the advanced payment program.
253. Cf. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 606 F.2d 1094,
1118-19 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding that the ICC had been unduly restrictive in decisions based on

the "thirty-day rule" because it failed to take account of all factors relevant to the timing problem).

